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I.

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

LEGAL CONCEPTUALISM:

[Vol. XXXVII

THE CASE OF THE CLEVER

CAR THIEF
Jimmy Myers came up with an interesting little racket. He bought wrecked
cars and then found similar ones to steal. He removed the engine and chassis
numbers from the wrecked cars and attached them to the stolen cars. He then
sold the stolen cars with the legal papers of the wrecked ones. A small flaw,
however, developed in his scheme. The cylinder block number had been indelibly stamped on the engine and could not be removed. Hence, when Myers
was caught and brought to trial, the prosecution introduced in evidence the
records of the car manufacturer to show that the cylinder block numbers of
the stolen cars did not match the engine and chassis numbers that had been
fraudulently transferred from the wrecked cars.
Myers objected to that evidence. The person testifying as to the contents
of the manufacturer's records had not personally entered the cylinder block
number. Admission of the records would therefore constitute hearsay. The prosecution could not use that evidence unless it could show the evidence qualified
under an established exception to the rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay.'
For example, the records would be admissible if the prosecution could show
the persons who made the entries were dead. 2 Unfortunately, no one knew who
made the entries, and it was impossible to know whether any of those persons
were alive. Likewise, had the records been public, they would have qualified
under an established exception. 3 The records, however, were privately maintained by the car manufacturer and fell within no recognized exception to the
4
hearsay rule.
The prosecution's only prospect was to argue that the rationale of the hearsay
rule justified the recognition of an exception in circumstances such as those of
the present case. The Solicitor-General must have been very pleased indeed
when the Court of Criminal Appeal concluded: "In our view the admission of
such evidence does not infringe the hearsay rule, because its probative value
does not depend on the credit of an unidentified person but rather on the
circumstances in which the record is maintained and the inherent probability
that it will be correct rather than incorrect.'' 5 When judgment on the appeal
was given in the House of Lords, the Solicitor-General must again have smiled
upon hearing Lord Reid comment on the view of the Court of Criminal Appeal:
"That if I may say so is undeniable as a matter of common sense." The
General's face must have fallen, however, when he heard the end of the sentence: "[B]ut can it be reconciled with the existing law? ' 6 Lord Reid found
that it could not, no matter how much sense it might make. Unfortunately for
the General, the majority took the view that courts must no longer engage in

1.
2.
(1964).
3.
4.
5.
6.

Myers v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1964] 2 All E.R. 881 (H.L.).
Id. at 889; Andrews, The Shackles of Rigidity and Fornalism, 27 MOD. L. REv. 606, 607
[1964]
[1964]
R. v.
[1964]

2 All E.R. at
2 All E.R. at
Myers, [1964]
2 All E.R. at

887, 892; Andrews, supra note 2, at 608.
890.
1 All E.R. 877, 881 (Grim. App.).
887.
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development of the law as they had during the evolution of the exceptions to
the hearsay rule. On that era, Reid commented:
One might hazard a surmise that when the rule proved highly inconvenient in a particular kind of case it was relaxed just sufficiently far
to meet that case, and without regard to any question of principle. This
kind of judicial legislation, however, became less and less acceptable and
well over a century 7ago the patchwork which then existed seems to have
become stereotyped.
Judicial legislation would now be unthinkable.8
Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest was of similar opinion. 9 He noted that "for
years past it has been recognized that legislation is needed in order to modify
the created edifice of the law of evidence."' 0 Regrettably, however, that modification would, in his view, require legislative action." His sentiment was shared
with equal conviction by Lord Hodson, who condemned the proposed modi2
fication as blatant judicial intervention.
Because those three Lords constituted a majority of the panel, adaptation
of the law of evidence was left to the Parliament. Effective action by the legislative body would be problematical, given the difficult nature of the task. 3
Even more insurmountable would be the legislature's burden if it wished to
instruct the courts to allow the rules to evolve in a commonsense fashion and
7. Id. at 884.
8. Lord Reid thought the Lords must not interfere with the province of the legislature
because:
[I]f we do in effect change the law, we ought in my opinion only to do that in cases
where our decision will produce some finality or certainty. If we disregard technicalities
in this case and seek to apply principle and common sense, there are a number of other
parts of the existing law of hearsay susceptible of similar treatment, and we shall probably
have a series of appeals in cases where the existing technical limitations produce an unjust
result.
Id. at 885. On that reason, Goodhart commented that it amounted to saying "that you ought not
to do a just thing today for fear that you might have to do a juster thing tomorrow." Goodhart,
Exceptions To The Hearsay Rule, 80 L.Q. REV. 457, 461 (1964) (citing F. CORNFORD, MICROCOSMOORAPHIA ACADEMICA

15 (4th ed. 1949)).

9. After canvassing the absence of justification for refusing to hear this evidence, he commented:
All this may suggest that some modification of the law could without dangerous consequences and with advantage be made. The existing exception to the hearsay rule which
admits evidence of declarations in the course of duty is, however, subject to the firmly
established condition that the death of the declarant must be shown. It would be a positive
alteration of the law to say that the condition need no longer be satisfied.
[1964] 2 All E.R. at 889.
10. Id. at 890.
11. Id.
12. "[T]his surely would be judicial legislation with a vengeance in an attempt to introduce
reform of the law of evidence which, if needed, can properly be dealt with only by the legislature."
Id. at 893.
13. "The snag of Lord Reid's view that it is for the legislature to bring in a reform is the
slowness of the legislature itself to react to the needs of law reform and adaption. He himself
admits that it is long overdue in this field." Andrews, supra note 2, at 610.
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save Parliament the trouble of attempting to solve every little problem that
happened to come along.14 Because of its stubborn insistence on sticking to the
letter of the law, Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions is a prime example of
6
5
modern English formalism,' an approach to law often known as conceptualism.'
7
The formalistic rigidity of Myers also earned the decision strong condemnation.
The most distinguished critic of the decision was the American-born Editor
of the noted Law Quarterly Review, Sir Arthur L. Goodhart, Q.C., Master of
University College and previous incumbent of the Chair of Jurisprudence at
Oxford.' Goodhart was certainly not known for unconventional jurisprudential
views, but his criticism of the decision is unflinching. Interestingly enough, in
the very same issue that his criticism appeared, Goodhart penned a memorial
to Dean Roscoe Pound, praising him for his fundamental contributions to jurisprudence, especially the notion that law "is an essential part of our civilisation
as a whole."' 9 The convergence of Myers' blatant reaffirmation of rigidity with
the close of Pound's illustrious career is intriguing because Pound had devoted
a major portion of his academic energies to the struggle against the formalism
of conceptualism.
II.

THE CONTROVERSIAL

NATURE OF JUDICIAL DECISION

The conceptualist approach of the Myers majority demonstrates clearly that
Pound's life-long campaign was not successful, especially in England. Why would
conceptualism remain so potent a force in thinking about law? The judgments
in Myers indicate the basic concern was legal certainty. To the conceptualists,
Pound's campaign against conceptualism was an attack on law itself, a flirtation
with the yawning chasm of skepticism. The result of such an attack would be
no law at all, anarchy. That anguish provides insight into the ongoing controversy regarding judicial decision. Is it simply a matter of applying the law?
Or is the idea of law an illusion, a spectre that vanishes in the clear sight of
skepticism? Any critic who dared to refuse that drastic choice would be caught,
as was Pound, between conceptualism and skepticism.

14. Goodhart comments: "There is much to be said for the judicial adjustment of the common
law because it leaves the law more flexible. A mixture of statutory and of judge-made law is rarely
a happy one." Goodhart, supra note 8, at 463.
15. Andrews, supra note 2, at 606, borrows the words of one of the dissenting judges as the
title for his review: "The Shackles of Rigidity and Formalism." Cf Goodhart, supra note 8, at
463 (questioning the extent to which judicial development of the law is still possible after Myers).
16. Though it is possible to offer fine distinctions between formalism and conceptualism, so
far as suggesting a rigid or mechanical quality in law, the two are normally taken as synonymous
and will so serve for purposes of this article. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 126, 249 (1961)
(employing the terms interchangeably, while recognizing a degree of imprecision in their general
usage). For a more recent comprehensive statement of formalism, see Moore, The Semantics ofJudgng,
54 S. CAL. L. REv. 151, 157-67 (1981).
17. Andrews, supra note 2, st 610, also condemns the decision because "it will certainly
hamper the work of the police" since "in many cases of this type it is not easy to get alternative
conclusive evidence."
18. See generally Goodhart, supra note 8.
19. Goodhart, Professor Roscoe Pound, 1870-1964, 80 L.Q. REv. 482, 485 (1964).
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A.

Between Conceptualism and Skepticism

Pound's most famous condemnation of conceptualism is found in his classic
1908 article excoriating mechanical jurisprudence. 20 Pound's approach was always characterized by his look at the larger view, seeing law in both historical
and societal perspective. Hence, he found that formalism in law was characterized by "periods in which science degenerates, in which system decays into
technicality, in which a scientific jurisprudence becomes a mechanical jurisprudence. "21 Pound thought the time had come for an end to the formalism
of conceptualism in law:
Jurisprudence is last in the march of the sciences away from the
method of deduction from predetermined conceptions. On the continent
of Europe, both the historical school of jurists and the philosophical
school, which were dominant until at least the last quarter of the nineteenth century, proceeded in this way. The difference between them
lay in the manner in which they arrived at their fundamental conceptions. The former derived them from the history of juristic speculation
and the historical development of the Roman sources. The latter, through
metaphysical inquiries, arrived at certain propositions as to human nature, and deduced a system from them.
This was the philosophical
theory behind the eighteenth-century movement for codification. Ihering
was the pioneer in the work of superseding this jurisprudence of conceptions (Begriffsurisprudenz) by a jurisprudence of results (Wirklichkeitsjurisprudenz). He insisted that we should begin at the other end; that
the first 22question should be, how will a rule or a decision operate in
practice?

Pound undoubtedly had in mind the kind of "rigid scheme of deductions
from a priori conceptions ' 23 found in the remarkable and almost interminable
1918 diatribe of John M. Zane against German legal philosophy.2 4 As World
War I ground tediously to a close, Zane endeavored to expose the necessarily
totalitarian character of German legal thinking. Incredibly, the primary targets

20.

Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. Rav. 605 (1908).

21. Id. at 607. Pound offers an illustration of such a period:
Roman law in its decadence furnishes a striking example. The Valentinian "law of citations" made a selection of jurisconsults of the past and allowed their writings only to
be cited. It declared them, with the exception of Papinian, equal in authority. It confined
the judge, when questions of law were in issue, to the purely mechanical task of counting

and of determining the numerical preponderance of authority. Principles were no longer
resorted to in order to make rules to fit cases. The rules were at hand in a fixed and
final form, and cases were to be fitted to the rules. The classical jurisprudence of principles
had developed, by the very weight of its authority, a jurisprudence of rules; and it is in
the nature of rules to operate mechanically.

Id.
22. Id. at 610 (emphasis in original). Pound further states: "The idea of science as a system
of deductions has become obsolete, and the revolution which has taken place in other sciences in
this regard must take place and is taking place in jurisprudence also." Id. at 608.
23. Id. at 608.
24. Zane, Gennan Legal Philosophy, 16 MicH. L. REv. 287 (1918).
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of Zane's wrath were Pound's heroes Rudolph von Ihering and Josef Kohler 25
who had struggled so mightily to break the formalistic bonds of German conceptualism. The obvious reason for this surprising irony was Zane's personal
dedication to conceptualism:
The theory that courts make law is the thesis maintained in Gray's
Nature and Sources of Law, but the very instances he cites prove that
courts do not make law, for the simple reason that the cases he cites
are all based on pre-existing rules. Any opinion can be read and the
decision will be seen to be a deduction from a more general rule. An
application of a rule to a new case does not make a new rule.26
Despite Zane's extensive discussion of Ihering and Kohler, almost no reference
is made to Pound's pathbreaking work bringing those ideas to Anglo-American
attention.2 7 Zane dismisses "the Sociological School of jurists" 2 and makes clear
29
his disdain for Pound's campaign against conceptualism.
Zane was clearly irked by Pound's manifesto for sociological jurists (1) as
advocating concern with the working of the law rather than its abstract content
and (2) as urging that legal precepts "be regarded more as guides to results
which are socially just and less as inflexible molds." ' 31 Nor could Zane have
been pleased by statements such as: *Conceptions are fixed. The premises are
no longer to be examined. Everything is reduced to simple deduction from

25.
26.

See id. at 360-74.
Id. at 346. Zane continues:
It happens that we as well as all civilized countries have judicial tribunals. These judicial
tribunals ascertain as best they can what are the general rules of law. They do not consciously invent rules for they all recognize that any judgment which they give is founded
upon a major premise which must be an existing rule of law. If they do not do this, they
are not performing a judicial act....
... Law is a concept, a generalized abstraction attained by mental processes. Generalized
concepts such as horse are type ideas which result from observation, but a generalized
concept like law is itself a higher abstraction from other abstract notions, which exist only
in the mind. The various rules of law are themselves abstract generalizations. The attempt
to define law is simply the attempt to find what the various abstract rules have in common.
It is not coercion by state power because that element is no part of the abstract rules. It
is not the fact that it is laid down by a superior power because the rules have not that
element in common. It is not the fact that the rules are stated by courts, for that fact is
not a common element. Nor do any of these facts enter into the abstraction.... [Tihe laws
of thinking, ... the truths of history and ... the demands of justice, ... all require a rule
of law antecedent to a judicial decision.
Id. at 346-48.
27. Pound is named once in the text, d. at 352, and in only one footnote, id. at 325 n.58.
He is discussed, without mentioning his name, id. at 351-52 & 351 n.85. At n.85, Zane refers to
two of Pound's three-part articles by volume number only, omitting author, title, page, and year.
Moreover, he is completely wrong as to two of the four volume numbers! Needless to say, all of
the references are contemptuous and vitriolic.
28. Id. at 352.
99. Id. at 350-52.
30. Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociologzcal Jurisprudence [concluded], 25 HARv. L. REV.
489, 516 (1912). This is one of the articles so incompletely cited by Zane, supra note 24, at 351
n.85.
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them. Principles cease to have importance. The law becomes a body of rules.
'
This is the condition against which sociologists now protest, and protest rightly.' 3
Zane probably felt a substantial degree of vindication, however, at the subsequent fate of Pound's campaign for attention to the consequences of law. As
quoted above, Pound was excited by Ihering's campaign to replace the jurisprudence of conceptions with "a jurisprudence of results." ' 32 However, Wirk-

lichkeitsjurisprudenz is more accurately translated as a jurisprudence of realities
3
or actualities than of results.

3

This concern for "reality" superseded Pound's own campaign for sociological
jurisprudence in the loyalties of many American lawyers. Pound's student Karl
Llewellyn found sociological jurisprudence not sufficiently realistic and in 1930
announced the time had come for greater realism. 34 Zane undoubtedly took
delight in the predicament of Pound arguing with Llewellyn over who was
sufficiently realistic.35 Zane's vindication, however, must have resided primarily
in his prevision that abandoning the certainty of conceptions would lead to the
utter chaos of legal realism. Such a degradation would be inevitable, in Zane's
view, once Pound stepped onto the slippery slope that denied the immutability
36
of conceptions.
31.
32.
33.

Pound, supra note 20, at 612.
Id. at 610.
Pound himself subsequently revised his interpretation.
It was a distinct advance when Ihering's demand for a jurisprudence of actualities led
to looking at legal precepts and doctrines and institutions with reference to how they work
or fail to work, and why. In keeping to this attitude the new realists are carrying on the
best tradition of the last generation.
Pound, The Call fora Realist Jurispudence, 44 HARV. L. RaV. 697, 706 (1931).
34. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurispndence-Te Next Step, 30 COLuM. L. REv. 431, 431 passim

(1930).
35. Pound responded to Llewellyn as follows:
There is not and cannot be the perfect uniformity and mechanical certainty of result which
the last century believed in. The dogma of a complete body of rules to be applied mechanically was quite out of line with reality. It is just as unreal and unjustifiably dogmatic
to refuse to recognize the function of the quest for certainty as contributing to the general
security. It is just as dogmatic and unreal to be blind to the extent to which the administration of justice attains certainty through rule and form and the extent to which the
economic order rests thereon. It is just as unreal to refuse to see the extent to which legal
technique, with all its faults, applied to authoritative legal materials, with all their defects,
keeps down the alogical or unrational clement or holds it to tolerable limits in practice.
Pound, supra note 33, at 706-07.
36. Zane refrained from direct comment on either Pound or his younger adversary, at least
after 1925. He did, however, reiterate his dark opinions of Kohler and Ihering. Zane, Book Review,
35 YALE L.J. 1026 (1926) (reviewing P. VINOGRADOFF, CuSToM AND RioHT (1925)). He also took
occasion to reaffirm his conceptualism in the course of a tribute to Dean Wigmore's work in
comparative law.
[A]mong all races who have reached the stage of what is called civilization, the most
general principles of law are practically the same. The essentials of the human mind and
its social actions in, and reactions to, the varying governmental institutions under which
a system of law exists continue the same. The forms of institutions and governments may
vary, but in the application of law to the ordinary civil relations in any social organization,
the development of the rules has been practically the same as civilization has advanced.
Zane, A Pioneer in Comparative Law, 29 ILL. L. REv. 456, 456-57 (1934).
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Llewellyn more than fulfilled the direst expectations Zane could possibly
have entertained. Where is the certainty of legal rules when it is possible to
say:
Do I suggest that (to cut in at one crucial point) the "accepted rules,"
the rules the judges say that they apply, are without influence upon their
actual behavior? I do not. I do not even say that, sometimes, these
"accepted rules" may not be a very accurate description of the judges'
actual3 behavior. What I say is that such accuracy of description is
rare. 7
But that dose of realism, it turned out, was only the beginning. Once he warmed
to the crusade, his evangelical ardor blossomed into the most memorable statement of the realist creed:
[F]inding out what the judges say is but the beginning of your task. You
will have to take what they say and compare it with what they do .... And
rules in all of this, are important to you so far as they help you see or
predict what the judges will do or so far as they help you get judges
to do something. That is their
importance. That is all their importance
38
except as pretty playthings
Such notorious statements are deservedly famous and were powerfully influential, despite the fact that Llewellyn subsequently qualified them sharply.3 9 The
die was cast and American legal thinking would never again be the same. A
few years later a young Lon Fuller, engaged in amiable criticism, would coin
the name "American Legal Realism" to distinguish Continental versions.' A
"school" of legal philosophy had been born;4" the spectre of skepticism would
haunt subsequent American legal thinking. Generations of lawyers would find
the very idea of conceptualism ludicrous and grotesque.
37. Llewellyn, supra note 34, at 444 (emphasis in original). The revival of skepticism in legal
theory in the context of a much more elaborate theoretical setting than realism is one artifact of
the Critical Legal Studies movement. See Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory,

94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
38. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 14 (reprinted 1960) (emphasis in original) (originally

published 1930).
39. See id. at 8-10 (Foreword to lectures). No doubt, some of the hyperbole can be attributed
to Llewellyn's flamboyant personality as well as to his desire to hold the attention of the entering
law students he was addressing. Nonetheless, these words have also been taken up as banners in

the front lines of the cause, at least in the eyes of many would-be followers. They have had a
profound influence, whether Llewellyn, in retrospect, wished they had or not.
See also K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960), in which
Llewellyn states:
It is true that there were a few misguided souls who, having observed with accuracy that
often neither the established and accepted generalizations ("rules" of law) nor the ones a
court in trouble was swinging around at the moment would fit into any comfortable simple
pattern of prediction or of guidance, arrived at the strange conclusion that no generalizations
in law got anywhere or meant anything ....
In my own case.. .this lone lorn sentence became,
internationally, the cited goblin-painting of realism.
Id. at 510-11 (emphasis in original)
40.
41.

Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 438 (1934).
See id. at 430 & n.6 ("As the realists themselves insist, there is no realist 'school'.").
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B.

Mechanical Jurisprudence Revived: Hart's Compromise Proposal

It is important to note, however, that this skepticism is an artifact of American
legal culture. English legal thinking remained relatively undisturbed in its conceptualistic tradition, having taken scant notice of the innovations of either
sociological or realistic jurisprudence. Hence, when H.L.A. Hart, Goodhart's
successor in the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford, crossed the Atlantic to address an American audience,4 2 he found it necessary to cope with the pervasive
skepticism of the American legal community. Hart's response was a compromise
proposal: The truth about legal rules is that the conceptualists are partly right
and the skeptics are partly right. Rules have "a core of settled meaning [the
insight of conceptualism], but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable
cases." 4 3 The latter is the realist contribution, and Hart explicitly recognized
it as such."4 The realists argued that the decision maker must exercise discretion,
which Hart sees as applicable in the penumbra. 45 To such "problems of the
penumbra," Hart conceded specifically that conceptualism could not apply. Applying legal rules "to specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter
of logical deduction, and so deductive reasoning... cannot serve as a model for
*
what judges.. .should do."
Hart's concession to the Realist skepticism of rules was an empty gesture,
however, for he incorporated that "penumbral" skepticism into his positivist
model.4 7 The "penumbra," he says, is not really a Realist contribution, for
John Austin had been highly sensitive to the necessity of judicial legislation in

42. Hart delivered the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School in April 1957.
Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1958).

43. Id. at 607.
44. The most skeptical of these critics-the loosely named "Realists" of the 1930'sperhaps too naively accepted the conceptual framework of the natural sciences as adequate

for the characterization of law and for the analysis of rule-guided action of which a living
system of law at least partly consists. But they opened men's eyes to what actually goes
on when courts decide cases, and the contrast they drew between the actual facts of judicial

decision and the traditional terminology for describing it as if it were a wholly logical
operation was usually illuminating; for in spite of some exaggeration the "Realists" made

us acutely conscious of one cardinal feature of human language and human thought,
emphasis on which is vital not only for the understanding of law but in areas of philosophy
far beyond the confines of jurisprudence.
Id. at 606-07. The "one cardinal feature of human language" to which Hart refers is the vagueness
of the penumbra.
45. [I]f we are to say that these ranges of facts do or do not fall under existing rules,
then the classifier must make a decision which is not dictated to him....Fact situations do
not await us neady labeled, creased, and folded, nor is their legal classification written on
them to be simply read off by the judge. Instead, in applying legal rules, someone must
take the responsibility of deciding that words do or do not cover some case in hand with
all the practical consequences involved in this decision.
Id. at 607.
46. Id. at 607-08.
47. "[W]hen [legal rules] fail to determine decisions, judges must legislate and so exercise
a creative choice between alternatives." Id. at 612. In H. HART, supra note 16, at 124, Hart states
"[i]f in such cases doubts are to be resolved, something in the nature of a choice between open
alternatives must be made by whoever is to resolve them." See also id. at 125.
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the penumbra. 48 In Hart's mind, only two real challenges remain. First, English
4 9
conceptualists must be reminded of Austin's tolerance for judicial legislation,
an aspect of positivism never popular there even before the Law Lords in London
Tramways Co. v.London County Council ruled that they were bound by their own
previous decisions.5 ° Second, American skeptics must learn that law does exist
in the settled area of "central meaning which rules have."'"
Hart thus presents a stark choice. Law consists only of rules narrowly understood. Anything else is legislation, a discretionary choice of the judge acting
as legislator. s2 Does an alternative exist? Hart recognizes that one could "include
in the 'rule' the various aims and policies in the light of which its penumbral
cases are decided on the ground that these aims have, because of their importance, as much right to be called law as the core of legal rules whose meaning
is settled." '5 3 In fact, such a view of the nature of rules has been popular among
American legal thinkers who reject the extremes of Realism and conceptualism
in favor of Pound's middle-ol-the-road view. Pound himself said:
One of the conspicuous actualities of the legal order is the impossibility
of divorcing what they do from the question what they ought to do or
what they feel they ought to do. For by and large they are trying to
do what they ought to do. Their picture of what they ought to do is
often decisive in determining what they do. Such pictures are actualities
quite as much as the materials of legal precepts or doctrines upon which
or with which they work. 4
Hart finds that view unappealing, preferring to "decide the penumbral cases
rationally by reference to social aims." ' 55 Apparently, Hart wishes to leave un48. Id. at 609 & 609-10 nn. 33-35.
49. Actually, Hart blames Blackstone for English conceptualism, on the basis that it derives
from Blackstone's view that judges ' find" rather than "make" law. Hart, supra note 42, at 610.
Hart's proposition is rather disingenuous from the standpoint of the intellectual history of AngloAmerican law. While it is true that the origins of English rigidity antedated Austin, there is ample
evidence that his influence strengthened that tendency by providing a more explicit justification for
judicial temerity. So far as Blackstone is concerned, it is clear that his influence on nineteenth
century American judicial thinking was quite the opposite of rigidity. See McKnight, Blackstone,
Quasi-Jurisprudent, 13 Sw. L.J. 399, 401 (1959). A. LOCKMILLER, SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE 181
(1958), reports that Blackstone's Commentaries were cited ten thousand times in American cases prior
to 1915. As Llewellyn's investigation Shows, the style of the American Grand Tradition was definitely
not rigid. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 39, at 64-72.
50. [1898] A.C. 375. Almost sixty years later, the principle was finally partially relaxed in
a practice statement. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234 (H.L.).
51. See Hart, supra note 42, at 614. Hart continues
Of course we might abandon the notion that rules have authority; we might cease to attach
force or even meaning to an argument that a case falls clearly within a rule and the scope
of a precedent. We might call all such reasoning "automatic" or "mechanical," which is
already the routine invective of the courts. But until we decide that this is what we want,
we should not encourage it by obliterating the Utilitarian distinction [between the law that
is, the core of the rule, and the law that ought to be, the rationale of the rule].
Id.
52. H. HART, supra note 16, at 128. Hart considers it "clear that the rule-making authority
must exercise a discretion." Id.
53. Hart, supra note 43, at 614.
54. Pound, supra note 33, at 700.
55. Hart, supra note 43, at 614.
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restricted the judge's discretion to maximize utility in solutions to penumbral
questions. 56 In that sentiment, he echoes Llewellyn's earlier challenge to conceptualism:
If deduction does not solve cases, but only shows the effect of a given
premise; and if there is available a competing but equally authoritative
premise that leads to a different conclusion-then there is a choice in
the case; a choice to be justified; a choice which can be justified only
as a question 57of policy-for the authoritative tradition speaks with a
forked tongue.
Moreover, to include the rationale as part of the rule threatens, in Hart's mind,
the distinctly legal quality of the "hard core of settled meaning. '58 The real
danger, as he sees it, is the standard conceptualist fear of uncertainty. Merging
the rationale with the rule would render "senseless" the idea that rules control
judicial decisions. 59
Such fears also seemed to motivate the majority in Myers. Common sense
would dictate that the rationale of the exception to the hearsay rule should be
applied to admit the register of cylinder block numbers. The court, however,
asked "can [such an approach] be reconciled with existing law? ' 60 In powerful.
testimony to Hart's core conception of a rule, the majority found that judicial
legislation would be required to admit the proferred private records, no matter
how much sense such action would make in light of the purpose of the rule
excluding hearsay evidence. Should the court exercise such discretion? Hart
concedes that to be a legislative task. Indeed, he states that many rules established by precedent "can now only be altered by statute, as the courts themselves
often declare in cases where the 'merits' seem to run counter to the requirements
of the established precedents.' '6 How can the Lords be faulted for finding it
appropriate to leave such legislation to the legislature? Yet, ironically, the Lords
are criticized merely for following the law as Hart has defined it. It seems a
rank injustice to denounce the judges for doing their best to preserve legal
certainty by adhering strictly to the core meaning of the rule.
C.

The Nature of Certainty: Reality or Illusion?

If even the majority judges concede that the decision in Myers flies in the
face of common sense, can they at least claim that the decision enhanced the
primary object of conceptualism: Legal certainty. Will strict adherence to the
56. "When the unenvisaged case does arise, we confront the issues at stake and can then
settle the question by choosing between the competing interests in the way which best satisfies us."
H. HART, supra note 16, at 126 (emphasis added).
57.
lewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARv. L. Rv.1222, 1252 (1931) (emphasis
in original). Llewellyn proceeds to make the point that the same reasoning applies to both expansive
and restrictive interpretations of precedent. Id. at 1252-53. Hart explicitly categorizes such narrowing
or broadening applications of precedent as "creative or legislative activity." H. HART, sura note
16, at 131.
58. Hart, supra note 42, at 614.
59. Id.
60. Myers v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, [1964] 2 All E.R. 881, 887 (H.L.).
61. H. HART, supra note 16. at 132.
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core of Hart's rules promote certainty in the law? Despite his recognition of
the penumbral "open texture" of law, certainty is unquestionably Hart's central
concern.6 2 What, however, is the nature of that certainty? How are officials
able to know what is determined by the rule? Some cases will present little
difficulty. Such cases will be ones "where there is general agreement in judgments as to the applicability of the classifying terms.' '63
The best indication of Hart's thinking process, however, may lie in his
explanation of why general standards are not completely determinate:
The first handicap is our relative ignorance of fact: the second is our
relative indeterminacy of aim. If the world in which we live were characterized only by a finite number of features, and these together with
all the modes in which they could combine were known to us, then
provision could be made in advance for every possibility. We could
make rules, the application of which to particular cases never called for
a further choice. Everything could be known, and for everything, since
it could be known, something could be done and specified in advance
by rule. This would be a world fit for "mechanical" jurisprudence.64
Certainty for Hart is thus based on providing the same treatment for any case
that shares a sufficient number of instances of similarity to the standard case.
The key is whether "the present case resembles the plain case 'sufficiently' in
'relevant' respects." 6 5 The determinancy of the plain case appears to be entirely
independent of the rationale for treating it in a particular way. Hence, the fact
that the rationale of the hearsay rule would justify admission of the records in
Myers makes no difference. Indeed, to accept that reason would reduce certainty
for Hart, because it ignores the fact that the new situation is not literally within
the existing rule. By setting law and judicial creativity (stigmatized as legislation) 66 in opposition to one another, Hart revives the spirit of Zane's conceptualism and its dedication to rigid application of the rules.
Despite the conceptualists' focus on legal certainty, they are not the only
ones concerned with it. For example, American legal thinking from Holmes to
the Realists was preeminently concerned with predictability of judicial decision
as a means to legal certainty. Moreover, Llewellyn added a further degree of
sophistication to such analysis by focusing on what was essential to assure legal
certainty for the citizenry in general. He concluded, as translated by Lon Fuller,
that:
Legal certainty for the layman is not predictability of judicial decision,
it is congruence between legal rules and the ways of life. Furthermore, this
kind of certainty cannot be achieved unless legal rules change. Congruence

62. "[T~he life of the law consists to a very large extent in the guidance both of officials
and private individuals by determinate rules which, unlike the applications of variable standards,
do not require from them a fresh judgment from case to case." Id. (emphasis in original).
63. Hart, supra note 42, at 123.
64. Id. at 125.
65. Id. at 124.
66. Id. at 131.
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with lay ways demands a constant
6 7 reshaping of legal rules, since social
norms are continually changing.
Obviously, that kind of certainty contrasts diametrically with the certainty of
Hart's standard case. By focusing on standard features, the certainty in Hart's
method is necessarily mechanical. Such an approach will not satisfy the ordinary
citizen, because the lay person expects common sense. Suppose the person whose
car is stolen is told that the thief cannot be prosecuted because the cylinder
block register is inadmissible in evidence. The response of the outraged citizen
to such a senseless technicality is likely to echo Mr. Bumble's riposte that "the
law is a ass-a idiot." ' 68 The normal anticipation that the law should make
sense requires that rules be applied in light of the purposes they are meant to
serve. A literal or mechanical approach is incapable of fulfilling that objective.
Citizens are not unfamiliar with the literal application of rules. They expect
precisely that from the most intractable bureaucradies. But they associate the
practice only with the Pickwickian "certainty" of frustration of reasonable expectations. In modem life, many also encounter literalism in the maddening
device of some labor unions known as the "work to rule." Although it is
uncorhmon in the United States, it is a popular device in many industrialized
countries with powerful union movements. Public employees who are forbidden
by law to strike often find they can exert all the pressure they wish by working
to rule. They carry out each task with extreme thoroughness; everything is
strictly by the book. In a number of countries, post office employees have found
they can back up the mail almost instantly simply by applying every rule
literally.
The proper characterization of such an abuse of rules is reflected in a
comment that Lon Fuller, following in Pound's middle-of-the-road tradition,
incorporated into the opinion of Mr. Justice Foster in his hypothetical Case of
the Contract Signed on Book Day. He laments the future of the law if judges were
pressured to "follow mechanically the demands of abstract verbal symbols like an unintelligent cook measuring out the misprints of a recipe.' '69 That is
the precise purpose of the union members. Their scheme is to mimic unintelligent cooks measuring out the misprints of a recipe, because their desire in
following the rules literally is to defeat the purpose of the rules. From that
instance, the lesson to be learned seems obvious: If the rules are to work, they
must be understood and applied in a way which focuses on the purposes they
are meant to serve.
That view, however, is directly contrary to Hart's contention that following
a rule means applying it mechanically. There is no need to resort to purpose
67. Fuller, supra note 40, at 432-33 (emphasis in original) (paraphrasing his own translation
of K. LLEWELLYN, PRAJUDIZIENRECHT UND RECHTSPRECHUNG IN AMERIKA, EINE SPRUCHAUSWAHL MIT
BESPRFcHUNG 83 (1933)). Llewellyn calls the article "Fuller's caustic but not unsympathetic full
critique, [but complains that] despite its own title, accessibility, and insight, has been little used."
K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 39, at 509 n.1.
68. C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST 387 (reprinted 1925) (originally published 1837). See Moore,
supra note 16, at 277-78 (the popular demand that law avoid absurd results).

69.

L.

FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE
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if the situation falls within the core meaning of the rule. Fuller, speaking through
Mr. Justice Foster, disagreed: "Every rule of law represents the projection of
a purpose. "70 Such a view avoids the fate of the literalistic cook measuring out
the misprints. When the unions work to rule, they are purposefully using the
rules literalistically in order to defeat the purpose of the rules.
A sharp contrast therefore emerges between Hart's view of rules as mechanically governing cases and Fuller's notion of rules as expressing "a purpose
that changes imperceptibly with experience and increased insight.' '7 Moreover,
the mechanical certainty provided by Hart's approach assumes that constant
meanings of the literal rules will be maintained. Fuller, on the other hand,
seeks certainty in the continual change of the meaning of a rule in light of the
evolving purpose(s) of the rule. The rule in its content and application will
change as the social purposes change. As Fuller states:
Often we can trace the history of a rule across time, marking how this
decision restricted it, this line of authorities extended it, this economic
development gave it a new direction, this scholarly article placed it in
a larger context where it acquired a new significance. Throughout this
development no one could deny two plain facts: 1) the rule never has
at any point of time exactly fixed boundaries; 2) the rule changes in
response to many forces. Some of these are "official," like statutes and
2
decisions; others are not, like the views of scholarly commentators.
Such sentiments directly contradict Hart because they deny that a definable
core ever exists. Law, conceived as a process, views rules as constantly responding to new stimuli, thereby bringing them to life.13 Predictably, Fuller
chose the phrase of another middle-of-the-roader, Benjamin Cardozo, to emphasize that law was always in a process of becoming: "The law never is, but
74
is always about to be."
The foregoing point suggests another fundamental contrast between these
views of the nature of rules: Do they provide a static or a dynamic perspective?
Hart's core changes, either expanding or contracting, only by legislative choice
exercised by judges. Alternatively, in the dynamic view of Cardozo and Fuller,
the law is constantly responding to a multiplicity of factors, and the precise
boundaries of the rule are never permanently defined because they are always
in a state of flux. Although the process of change is constant, the dynamic
view of rules differs from the realist denial that rules have meaning.15 In a
70. Id. at 89.
71.
L. FULLER, supra note 69, at 89.
72. Id. at 89.
73. Id. at 82. Dean Levi comments in similar vein: "The categories used in the legal process
must be left ambiguous in order to permit the infusion of new ideas." E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LEGAL REASONING 4 (1948).
74. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 126 (1921). It is interesting to note
that the phrase is used by Cardozo to express the legal nihilism consequent on John Chipman
Gray's view that law is only what the judges say it is. See generally J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND
SOURCES OF THE LAw (1909). Gray's views were also criticized by Zane. See supra text accompanying
note 26.
75. Levi expresses the point as follows: "[Clhange in the rules is the indispensable dynamic
quality of law." E. LEVI, supra note 73, at 2.
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sense, the dynamic view takes rules even more seriously by seeing them as
living instruments. In contrast, Hart's "compromise" proposal actually sees
rules only as static concepts.
In summary, three sharply varying views emerge of the nature of rules and
of how judges should treat them. Hart's revived conceptualism promotes the
wooden certainty of literalism. Realist skepticism serves up the certainty of the
abyss while promising choice based on sound public policy or whatever other
preferences happen to appeal to the powerholders. The Pound-Cardozo-Fuller
tradition seeks a tentative certainty in social norms and purposes amidst the
dynamic of change. In the American legal experience, the controversial nature
of judicial decision is encapsulated in those three positions. How is it possible
to choose among such perspectives? Is the quest for some certainty in law an
illusion? Exploring such questions requires a more detailed study of how judicial
decisions are made. More importantly, the controversy invites rethinking the
subject altogether.
III.

RETHINKING JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING

To answer the question how judges should decide cases, inquiry into the
available alternatives is necessary. For conceptualists and others devoted to mechanical approaches, the judge's instrument of operation is deductive logic, a
point that is explicit in Zane and implicit in Hart's core. The Realists and
other skeptics deny any role for logic, at least in their more iconoclastic moments. Unfettered choice is the burden of the judge in their view, a predicament
shared by the judge confronted with decisions in Hart's penumbra. How can
the judge avoid such harsh alternatives? What option is available other than
formal logic or unfettered discretion? How is the judge in the middle view
supposed to make decisions that are not shackled by formal logic and yet are
constrained, and therefore reasonably predictable? Pound's balancing of competing interests provides a general idea but few clear details. 7 7 Even when the
judge is exhorted to apply the law with reference to its purpose, as Fuller did,
the mechanisms to be used in following that injunction are unspecified. 78 Such
information is, however, available in an extensive literature on judicial decisionmaking,7 9 much of it spawned in reaction to the Realist' challenge. One
76. E.g., R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 42-47 (rev. ed. 1954).
See also J. STONE, SocIA. DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 164-82 (1966).
77. In general the sociological jurists stand for what has been called equitable application of the law; that is, they conceive of the legal rule as a general guide to the judge,
leading him toward the just result, but insist that within wide limits he should be free to

deal with the individual case, so as to meet the demands of justice between the parties
and accord with the general reason of ordinary men.
Pound, supra note 30, at 515.
78. But cf. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REV. 376 (1946) (sketching a
theory of adjudication).
79. See, e.g., H. HART & A. SAcKs, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958); E. LEVI, supra

note 73; J.

STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAwYERs' REASONINGS 235-337 (1964) (successor ed. to THE
PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw ch. 7 (1946)). Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 39 (advocating the
Grand Tradition as a model of judicial decision); B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL

PROCESS (1921) (urging an eclectic approach to judicial reasoning).
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of the most important of the more recent contributions is the exploration of
the use of non-formal or inductive reasoning in legal argument by Professor
Chaim Perelman of the Free University of Brussels.80 Perelman's proposal for
a revival of the art of rhetoric provides a useful starting point for rethinking
judicial decisionmaking.
A.

The New Rhetorics

Hart's contrast between core and penumbra is an expression of his compromise between skepticism and conceptualism or formalism. Perelman similarly
contrasts formalism and skepticism. Because he is working in the Continental
tradition, however, Perelman chooses as his archetype of skepticism the Legal
Existentialism of Georg Cohn"t in place of Hart's choice of American Legal
Realism. In Legal Existentialism, Perelman writes, "decisions are not made on
the basis of general rules, but it is the consideration of every concrete case,
with all its attending particular circumstances, which allows the applicable rules
to be ascertained." '8 2 Perelman rejects that view, just as he rejects formalism.
Formalism, like existentialism, represents an exaggeration. But Perelman responds to the dichotomy of conceptualism and skepticism differently than Hart.
Instead of attempting to combine the two in a core/penumbra model, Perelman
rejects the notion that the true picture of law is half formalism and half skepticism. Perelman rejects formalism because, in the fashion of Zane, it misunderstands the nature of law as deductive reasoning. Perelman's insight is that
the logic of law is inductive. But it is a logic, and the mistake of the existentialists is to ignore that fact.
Perelman's major contribution to legal thought is the notion that legal reasoning requires the use of persuasive argument. Hence, Perelman has renewed
Aristotle's study of the techniques of persuasive argument. The purpose of
Perelman's "New Rhetorics" is to explore the techniques of persuasion that
lawyers typically use in legal argument.8 3 Unlike the product of a formal deductive syllogism, the result of legal argumentation is not a conclusion. Instead,
' 4
Perelman says, it is "a decision which the judge justifies on stated grounds."
The stated grounds are the reasons given by the judge for finding the arguments
of one side more persuasive than those of the other side.

See C. PERELMAN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE AND THE PROBLEM OF ARGUMENT (1963); C.
& L. OLBRECHTS-TYTEcA, THE NEw RHETORIC (Wilkinson & Weaver transl. 1969);
Perelman, What is Legal Logic?, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 1 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Legal Logic?];
Perelman, Judicial Reasoning, 1 ISRAECL L. REv. 373 (1966).
81. E.g., G. COHN, ExISTENTIALISM AND LEGAL SCIENCE (G. Dendal transl. 1967).
82. See Legal Logic?, supra note. 80, at 5 (citing G. COHN, supra note 81, at 115-20).
83. "What is specific in legal logic is that it is not a logic of formal demonstration [i.e., of
deductive processes,] but a logic of argumentation which uses, instead of analytical proofs which are
compelling, dialectical proofs which aim at convincing or persuading the audience (in this case the
judge)." Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).

80.

PERELMAN

84.

Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss2/3

16

Moffat: Judicial Decision as Paradigm: Case Studies of Morality and Law i

1985]

JUDICIAL DECISION AS PARADIGM

1.

The Ambiguity of Rules

Legal reasoning consists of arguments which, Perelman says, do not lead
to a necessary conclusion." Nonetheless, Perelman's rejection of existentialism
is based on the residual assumption that the rhetorical process in any particular
case will produce a rule. However, the process seems not to be required in
applying rules. Rather, the points at which the process of persuasive reasoning
will be called for are "where the choice of the rule poses a legal problem
because of the existence of a number of competing rules, or by reason of lacunae
in the law or when the law requires interpretation to determine the scope of
its application."18 6 Interestingly, such statements suggest that interpretation of
rules will not normally be necessary in applying them. Indeed, Perelman seems
to embrace a degree of formalism by assuming the rule could apply itself to
subsequent cases without need for some intervening act of judgment which
would be illuminated by the persuasive process.
This assumption is troublesome. Perelman's promising beginning seems incomplete. He has rejected the formal quality of self-applying concepts of the
earlier age of conceptu "sm. He has also, on the other hand, rejected the
skepticism of existentialism and, inferentially, of American Legal Realism by
interposing persuasive argumentation. But, like Hart, he seems willing to settle
for the lesser formalism of rules. Perhaps, like Hart, he sees the necessity of
such a bulwark in order to preserve some vestige of certainty in the law. More
likely, rules seem to be a necessary consequence of the persuasive process. After
all, if the outcome of the persuasive process is only the decision of a particular
case, then how is one to distinguish such a result from legal existentialism?
Thus, Perelman seems to find meaning in the rules that are the product of
the persuasive process. When we have to choose one rule over another, "an
appreciation of the consequences will urge that one rule may be preferred to

another.'

'87

Nonetheless, his apparent assumption of self-applying rules is inconsistent
with his perception of the operation of the process of argumentation. Rules must
have consequences for Perelman, since "numerous theories and judicial constructions have been elaborated for the sole purpose of avoiding the application
of legal rules in cases where they would lead to unacceptable consequences." 8
Such statements, however, evince an ambivalence toward rules, because Perelman appears to approve the process of argumentation being used to overrule
rules. Is such an act a matter of judicial legislation? Or is overruling on the
basis of argumentation an appropriate judicial act? Clearly, Perelman sees that
some rules require overruling:

85. The arguments "may be strong or weak, but in no case will they provide a formally
correct process of reasoning whose conclusion forcibly imposes itself." Id. at 5.
86. Id. at 4. Perelman also indicates "in the case of antinomies, lacunae, conflicts of rules
of law and incompatibility between rules applied to the solution of antinomies" resort to legal logic
will be necessary. Id. at 5.

87. Id. at 5.
88.

Id.
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Only when it becomes necessary to determine how far a case is essentially
similar to recognized precedents must we have recourse to juridical "topics," i.e., to all the considerations usually taken into account when interpreting and applying the law. These will consist of grounds whose
pertinence and importance have not been neglected by former judges,... and
which may not be ignored except for reasons
which appear more im89
portant and justify a reversal of case law.
Two ideas in the foregoing passage merit attention. First, the idea is reiterated that some rules can be overruled, if the judges are persuaded by the
reasons offered. Second, the question is raised as to how meaningful rules are,
because both "interpreting and applying the law" are included now as requiring
the application of persuasive reasoning. Similarly, Perelman states that, once
the judgment is rendered, it becomes binding precedent and the person seeking
to upset the established principle must advance persuasive reasons." Again,
apparently, the rule is established by argumentation. But, as with the Lord,
what argumentation giveth, it may take away, for it may provide a basis for
overruling an undesirable rule. Rules appear to possess an ambiguous nature
for Perelman, oscillating between firmness and flexibility.
2.

The Nature of Argumentation

Confusion clearly exists concerning the status of rules and their meaning
under the approach of the "New Rhetorics." These apparent problems can be
solved by pursuing Perelman's approach consistently. A consistent view of legal
reasoning would include a place for rules that avoids the ambiguities that seem
to bedevil Perelman's exposition. Consistency is the key element in carrying
through the consequences of argumentation not only for judicial reasoning but
to a comprehensive view of the function of judicial decisionmaking in the judicial
process at large. To demonstrate this concept, Perelman's approach must be
restated. The starting point of rhetorics is the truth that persuasive or inductive
reasoning is not demonstrative but dialectical. It never produces an absolute
conclusion. It is characterized, for example, by arguments by analogy," arguments ad absurdum, and an array of other techniques of inductive argument.
To illustrate, imagine the following two cases. The first case has facts a,
b, c, d, e, f, and g with result x. The rule states that when these factors are
present, x is the result. The next case presents factors a, b, c, d, e, f, no g,
but h. Perelman says that persuasive reasoning is based on a fundamental
89.

Id. at 5-6.

90. [The judgment] together with its ratio decidendi-is now binding as law and
takes its place in the legal order to the elaboration of which it contributes. It will be
sufficient, thereafter, to refer to the precedent in order to support a decision, any person
who seeks to upset case law having to advance the grounds which.. .should prevail over
those previously accepted.
Id. at 6.
91.
Levi is noted for his claim that the "basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by
example." E. LEvi, supra note 73, at 1. It is clear that he means argument by analogy. His work
provides a number of fine examples of the development of case law utilizing that technique of
argumentation. Cf Legal Logic?, supra note 80, at 1-2 (commenting on Levi's approach).
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principle of justice: The notion that like cases should be treated alike. 92 How
then should the new case be approached? One solution would be that, because
it is highly similar to the previous case, as a matter of justice, the same result
ought to apply. But no one is comfortable trying to make such a judgment in
the abstract. 93 Only when g and h are known is it possible to decide intelligently.
Those factors may be inconsequential or, alternatively, they may be highly
relevant and provide the basis for a crucial distinction.
How is that judgment of relevance made? Hart's test is whether the cases
are "sufficiently" similar. But that formula begs the question. In the normal
situation, the basis will be the rationale of the previous case. The rationale of
the previous case, however, may not cover the new situation. That rationale
may need to be elaborated in the light of other legal principles. Elaboration
may also be required in terms of moral arguments that do not have a specific
formal legal standing. All this (and more) may be required in order to arrive
at a judgment which is acceptable in explaining why the second situation should
or should not be treated the same as the previous case. Regardless of the
conclusion, the judgment will be the result of the process of persuasive reasoning
that Perelman advocates.
That process of persuasive reasoning is built on starting points that are
fundamental value assumptions. Perelman has a term for these, also borrowed
from the Greek, topoi, the plural of topos. 94 A literal translation is topic, but
its meaning is the place or seat of argument, the starting point of discussion.
In other words, it represents the fundamental value assumptions one makes.
Those assumptions define the place or topic of the argument. For persuasive
argumentation to take place, some shared beginning point is necessary. Suppose
an anti-abortionist asks, "Don't you oppose the taking of innocent human life?"
If the answer is "No," he will be frustrated, because the starting point of his
argument has been denied. Suppose though that, after he recovers from his
shock, he tries again by saying, "That's terrible; don't you value the sanctity
of life?" If at that point, the answer is again "No," he will be completely
frustrated, because the fundamental value premise of his argument has been
rejected.
92. "[Tlhe rule of justice
... ordains that essentially similar cases should be dealt with in
similar manner." Legal Logic?, supra note 80, at 4 (emphasis in original). Levi puts the point thus
V'[t]he problem for the law is: When will it be just to treat different cases as though they were
the same? A working legal system must therefore be willing to pick out key similarities and to
reason from them to the justice of applying a common classification." E. Lav, supra note 73, at
I. Cf. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTs SERIOUSLY 113 (1978) ("The gravitational force of a precedent
may be explained by appeal ... to the fairness of treating like cases alike."). Contra Winston, On
Treating Like Cases Alike, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1974) (criticizing both Perelman, id. at 5-9, 20-22,
the idea of like treatment as a moral principle, id. at 9-20, and the ideal of equal treatment as
a principle of logic, id. at 21-35).
93. Precisely that point regarding the meaning of the terminology of legal analysis is made
tellingly in Fuller's hypothetical Case of the Interrupted Whambler. L. FULLER, supra note 69, at
628-38. He offers a rather effective demonstration that our view as to the proper result in the case
will depend upon the nature of the "undefined activity, 'whambling'." See id. at 637 (Question

4).
94. Legal Logic?, supra note 80, at 3. See T.
also J.
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Once a starting point is established, an argument may be constructed. Suppose in the imaginary case set forth above the lawyer on one side argues,
"Listen, g and h are both unimportant. Neither is significant. These cases are
essentially similar and should be treated identically." That technique would be
a form of argument by analogy. The lawyer on the other side might argue,
"No, g is significant, and the difference that h involves provides a basis for
distinguishing the cases. What is more, the reason for drawing the line is that
if you admit h this time, then you have no reason to refuse to admit i, j, k,
or 1 in future cases. Who can possibly imagine applying this rule to 1? That
would be absurd." This tactic is an example of ad absurdum, another sort of
legal argument. Of course, the challenge made by the argument ad absurdum is
to discover some sensible distinction which cuts the extension of the rule off
at h and avoids reaching the absurd 1. As Ronald Dworkin has argued more
recently, one of the fundamental characteristics of argument is the demand for
consistency. 95 This demand explains the opposing side's compulsion to respond
to the slippery slope ad absurdum argument. Suppose the opposing side says,
"We just want h this time. There is no need to worry about the rest of those
possibilities for the future; we would never extend it to 1." They are faced
with a problem of inconsistency, because they have not offered a reason for
treating h in one way and 1 in a different way. Consistency demands they do
so, because the plaintiff's argument is, after all, that h is sufficiently like g
that the cases ought to be treated the same. The defense says, "What about
i, j, k, and ?" The plaintiff must then provide a plausible reason that distinguishes between h and the rest of those cases.6 Moreover, the reason must
ordinarily be plausibly consistent with the rationale of the previous case or line
of cases.
B.

The Nature of Rules Revisited

One of the consequences of thinking about the nature of legal reasoning as
argumentation is that rules appear in a different light. Consider the two cases
again. Suppose that g and h turn out to be only the times at which the cases
arose. Is that a relevant or an irrelevant difference? A conceptualist would say
it must be irrelevant. The legal existentialists would disagree. Each case is
unique, at least in time. Perelman rejects the uniqueness argument, because
our best judgment may be that they should be treated the same. It is not really
possible to say whether time matters without further facts to put the situation
in context. Occasionally, time will make a difference. In many cases, it will

95. R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 88 ("articulate consistency"). "An argument of principle
can supply a justification for a particular decision, under the doctrine of responsibility, only if the
principle cited can be shown to be consistent with earlier decisions not recanted, and with decisions
that the institution is prepared to make in the hypothetical circumstances." Id. (emphasis added).
See also id. at 115-23.
96. The necessity of offering a reason runs throughout Judge Ginsburg's address, published
elsewhere in this issue. Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 205 (1985). Judge
Ginsburg, notes that at the post-oral argument conference, "[elach judge reports how he or she is
inclined to rule and why." Id. at 211. On the ad absurdam argument, see generally Schauer, Slippery
Slop.es, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1985).
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be utterly irrelevant. The two cases will also normally differ in the parties
involved, a difference which will usually be irrelevant. Most of the time, the
97
cases will present a considerable number of further factual distinctions.
The mere fact that the parties or the times are different would seldom disturb
the "application of the rule." The existentialist point is that, in any second
situation, some potential factual grounds will always be available to distinguish
the situations, at least as a technical matter. 98 Hence, as a matter of principle,
an automatic application of the previous rule is impossible. At the least, the
quick judgment must be made that the minor differences are unimportant. The
only way that can be done, however, is by applying the rationale of the rule. 99
That application in turn requires the process of argumentation, despite the fact
that many situations can be determined quickly and easily. The rule is simply
"applied" to the situation. 100 That easy judgment may be what Perelman has
in mind when speaking of rules in the seemingly concrete manner that he does.
If so, that apparent ambiguity should be clarified by reconstructing the function
of rules in the process of argumentation.
That reconstruction will be assisted by once again comparing the rhetorical
view of law with Hart's focus on the core. Hart assumes that cases falling
within the core of the rule are governed by the rule automatically. What that
assumption ignores is the act of judgment that is involved in deciding that they
do fall within the rule. That judgment is that, because this case has sufficiently
similar facts and its differences are sufficiently irrelevant, it should be treated
as falling within the rule.' 0 ' The point is that that judgment can only be made
with reference to the rationale that is used to judge the importance of similarities
and the relevance of differences. 10 2 This approach, however, may open up the
97. The issue of uniqueness was one of those aired in the Pound-Llewellyn debate. At that
time, Pound commented:
Undoubtedly single cases are in greater or less degree unique, and this uniqueness, often
quite relative, may or may not be significant. Likewise there are common elements in
cases, and these may or may not be significant for any particular problem or situation.
The unique aspects of cases, the common aspects of them, and generalizations from the
common aspects, may or may not be useful instruments according to the connection in
which we look at them and the tasks to which we apply them.
Pound, supra note 33, at 707.
98. Judge Ginsburg opposes claims of uniqueness in noting that a court "may not rely on
unarticulated intuition." Ginsburg, supra note 96, at 207. Moreover, "[t]he law we identify and apply
is not cast for day and case alone. We cannot rely entirely on today's parties to define law
that will touch tomorrow's controversies." Id. at 208.
99. It is because the rationale of the rule must be applied that it is a manner of concern
whether cases "are in fact decided with sufficient care and hard thought." Id. at 214-15.
100. Levi recognizes that "the connotation of the word for a time has a limiting influenceso much so that the reasoning may even appear to be simply deductive." E. LEvi, supra note 73,
at 8.
101. Levi suggests: "T]he scope of a rule of law, and therefore its meaning, depends upon
a determination of what facts will be considered similar to those present when the rule was first
announced. The finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the legal process." Id. at 2.
102. The importance of the elaboration of the rationale is illustrated in the criteria employed
for selection of judicial opinions for publication. The principal question is "the precedential value
of the disposition - does it involve any new or clarifying statement about the law?" Ginsburg,
supra note 96, at 220.
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objection that neither method makes any difference in result. In an easy case,
the rhetorical method appears to arrive at the same conclusion as Hart's approach. Each would treat the case as falling within the rule. The advocate of
persuasive argument must concede, as Perelman seems to, that the notion of
a rule does serve as a convenient shorthand.
This insight can be illustrated by the experience of dealing with small children. Small children have a way of questioning and testing rules. They want
to know if the fact that they must not pick up the ashtray on the coffee table
in the living room means that they should also refrain from touching the vase
on the side table in the den. Because the children's supervisor understands the
rationale of the rule, that person finds the constant requestioning of the limits
of the rule rather tiring. Why? Not because the rule is self-applying, but because
the rule in fact serves as a great short-hand convenience for a judgment previously made that a particular purpose is served in a certain situation. It is a
judgment, because all value questions concerning it have been momentarily answered. For the time being, the rule represents how the arguments of justice
and policy are best resolved in producing a particular result in this kind of
case. Having settled this, anyone applying rules finds it a bore to go through
all those arguments again, each time a similar situation arises.'0 3 The desire is
simply to apply the "rule" and get on to other matters that have not yet been
worked out and therefore require greater attention.
Based on this explanation of normal thought processes, the point of theoretical importance regarding the core notion of the rule can now be readdressed.
The problem with Hart's positivism is that it suggests that a rule is real,
concrete, definite. That view is a far cry from the notion of a simple convenience
for the generalizations people make. A useful parallel occurs in the concept of
gestalt from German psychology. A gestalt is literally a form that is imposed on
stimuli by the mind. 1 4 If a rule is thought of as a gestalt, it becomes a symbol
for a whole set of judgments. It is a neatly wrapped package of decisions made
between competing arguments to settle the matter for the present time.' 5 The
significance of seeing a rule as a gestalt is to recognize that the decision which
it represents is, theoretically, reviewable at any time. In a changing society,
recognition of that truth regarding law is crucial, because value judgments, and
consequently decisions as to which differences between two situations are significant, change over time. A temporal perspective, which views the law as it
develops over a period of time, reveals that rules as gestalts grow, develop,
6
endure for a time, and are typically replaced by a different rule later on.
An example will be useful in clarifying this picture of rules.
103. E. LEVI, supra note 73, at 2.
104. See generally W. KOHLER, GFSTALT PSYCHOLOGY (1929). The focus of the present exploration
is the perception of rules by the legal community, including deciding judges. The special utility
of the gestalt notion is in providing insight into the apparently solid nature of rules and their
consequent "easy" application.
105. And, as precedent, it is perceived as both guiding and restraining. Ginsburg, supra note
96, at 206-07.
106. The first stage is the creation of the legal concept which is built up as cases are compared. The period is one in which the court fumbles for a phrase. Several phrases may
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The Rise and Fall of Rules: The Case of Equal but Separate
0 7
One using Hart's approach would presumably say that Plessy v. Ferguson
in 1896 established the rule of "separate but.equal." Hart calls that sort of
decision a legislative act, because the judiciary is exercising full discretion in
its interpretion. Because no established rule constrains the Court, it must make
a legislative choice.
The subject of interpretation in Plessy was the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, a fairly recent constituitional provision at that time. The
fourteenth amendment had been adopted in 1868. One of its provisions prohibited any state from denying "to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."' 0 8 In Plessy, the Supreme Court interpreted that phrase
and found that Louisiana legislation requiring railways to "provide equal but
separate accommodations for the white and colored races" did not conflict with
the requirement of equal protection of the laws. 0 9 How accurate is it to characterize the Court's pronouncement, as Hart would, as a sudden act of judicial
legislation? Previous cases construing the post-Civil War amendments indicate
that Plessy was not so much of a surprise." 0 It certainly did not suddenly emerge
full bloom from barren earth. Examination of the opinion shows the Court
found grounds for its approach in a number of previous cases" as well as
C.

be tried out; the misuse or misunderstanding of words itself may have an effect. The
concept sounds like another, and the jump to the second is made. The second stage is
the period when the concept is more or less fixed, although reasoning by example continues
to classify items inside and out of the concept. The third stage is the breakdown of the
concept, as reasoning by example has moved so far ahead as to make it clear that the
suggestive influence of the word is no longer desired.
E. L~vi, supra note 73, at 8-9.
107. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
108. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, 5 1.
109. 163 U.S. at 540.
110. The Plessy opinion cited the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1879), and Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 163 U.S. at 54243, 545-46. R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JusT cE 77-81 (1976), is thoroughly scathing in his criticism of
the Court's misuse of authority. The point of Kluger's complaint is that no previous Supreme
Court decision stated any rule which would cover the Plssy situation. Undoubtedly, that is true.
The opinion, however, expressed adherence to the distinction between civil/political and social rights
that it perceived in the earlier cases. 163 U.S. at 543-46. A central issue was whether the state
could regulate intrastate commerce without infringing on the congressional prerogative to regulate
interstate commerce. Id. at 546-48. The Court also devoted substantial attention to its concern
with interference with "subjects that are within the domain of state legislation." Id. at 546-47.
That topic now seems quaint but was then a central issue in many cases in an era when federalism
was taken much more seriously than we are presently able to imagine. Moreover, the Court reflected
accurately the emerging social consensus, the "toxins of racism" poignantly described by Kluger.
R. KLUOER, supra at 69-71, 84-91. The Court was responding to moral arguments, no matter how
immoral that argument may now appear.
111. The Court, citing a number of state and federal cases, termed Roberts v. City of Boston,
59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 209-10 (1850), the leading case in which the decision to require racial
segregation of the schools was determined to be "founded on just grounds of reason and experience,
and in the results of a discriminating and honest judgment." Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544-45. Roberts
earned its priority because it was such an early case, because it was authored by the noted Chief
Justice Shaw, and because, the Court seemed pleased to note, separation had been "held to be
a valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of states where the political rights of the
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congressional actions contemporaneous with the adoption of the fourteenth
amendment.' 2 "Judicial legislation" is a rather brutal description for the culmination of the developmental process involved. It is, however, easier to apply
such an epithet to decisions one finds morally distasteful.
Consider next the judicial situation once Plessy was handed down. In strict
terms, Plessy addressed public transportation only; in that sphere, "enforced
separation of the races" did not deny "the equal protection of the laws.'
But education," 4 integrated private institutions,"' and housing area restrictions" 6
colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced." Id. at 544. A good indication of the
general view of racial segregation prior to Plessy is provided by J. Harper, who states:
The weight of authority accords with the view.. .that [the equal protection clause] still leaves
it within the discretion of the legislatures of the several states to provide separate schools
for colored children.... But all these decisions hold that the advantages afforded by such
schools must be, in all respects, substantially equal to those furnished by the schools for
white pupils [citing a federal case and cases from five states] ....
Opposed to this view stands... [tihe opinion.. .against a caste classification,.. .an excellent
example of the advanced and progressive spirit of our western states [citing cases from
Kansas, Iowa, and Michigan].
Note to United States v. Buntin, 10 F. 730, 736 (1882) (J. Harper, reporting).
112. The Court also cited congressional legislation requiring school segregation in the District
of Columbia. 163 U.S. at 545. Kluger comments that the congressional law "did not require
segregation of the schools but permitted local custom to dictate." R. KLUcaR, supra note 110, at
76-77. The Court's characterization of the effect of the legislation seems more accurate. See REV.
STAT. D.C. §§ 281-83, 310 & 319 (1875).
113. 163 U.S. at 548. The Court did not actually enunciate the standard of "separate but
equal" in Plessy. The standard applied in Plessy could more accurately be termed "separate is
reasonable." Id. at 550-52. Contra P. KLUGER, supra note 110, at 81.
114. The first education case arose three years later when black taxpayers in Richmond County,
Georgia, sought to enjoin the board of education from operating a high school for white students.
The black high school had been converted to primary education for blacks without further provision
of high school education for blacks because of lack of funds. Cumming v. County Bd. of Educ.,
95 U.S. 528 (1899). The Court found that the evidence did not permit it "to regard that decision
as having been made with any desiie or purpose on the part of the Board to discriminate against
any of the colored school children of the county on account of their race." Id. at 544 The case
was determined largely on the basis of the equity pleadings. Not only did it fail to elaborate the
Plessy rule, it did not even cite the case. To the extent that the merits of the case were addressed,
the focus appears to have been the reasonableness of the board of education's action under the
circumstances of the case. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 (1954) and R. KLUCER,
supra note 110, at 83, classify the case as involving the separate but equal doctrine.
115. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908), upheld state legislation prohibiting the
simultaneous education of blacks and whites, even in private institutions. The Court ducked the
constitutional questions by basing its decision on the narrow ground of the power of the state to
alter the terms of the charter of a state-created institution. Id. at 56. Again Plessy was not cited.
116. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), struck down a Louisville city ordinance that
required housing to be racially segregated according to the majority population in each block. The
Court grounded its action on the state's interference with the property right of freedom to contract
which is protected from deprivation without due process of law under the fourteenth amendment.
Id. at 82. Responding to the argument that the ordinance was justified on the basis of Plessy, the
Court distinguished reasonable regulation from destruction of rights. Id. at 79-80. Private agreements
to establish racially restrictive covenants were, however, upheld in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926). The Court found that the private action involved failed to provide any basis for asserting
federal jurisdiction. Id. Neither Buchanan nor Plessy was cited. The court below, however, reached
the merits and found Plessy authoritative for the validity of racial segregation in general, "where
the method adopted does not amount to the denial of fundamental constitutional rights." Corrigan
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were not addressed. Did Pessy apply to them as well? Can one know the answer
to such questions simply by knowing the "rule"? Or is it a matter of the
Court making a legislative choice that includes these other categories with public
transportation? In historical reality, the result was certainly not a matter of
automatic application of any rule. Even the transportation cases that followed
Plessy presented knotty problems for judicial resolution, not because of the equal
protection issue, but because of the intersection of other issues."17 Subsequent
history is not always as straightforward as one might expect.
However, Hart might take comfort in reiterating his belief that, even if the
"rule" did not always solve cases, all instances not decided by the rule are in
the penumbra of the rule. Consequently, the courts must decide them as a
matter of judicial legislation. But that description is farfetched, too. The potential significance of PLessy was not immediately apparent either to the Supreme
Court or to the lower courts."18 The case was infrequently cited in any setting,"19
and it was almost twenty years before the Court first stated that Plessy stood
for the proposition "that it was not an infraction of the 14th Amendment for
2 0
a state to require separate, but equal, accommodations for the two races."2'
Interestingly, that first formulation of "separate but equal" occurred when
v. Buckley, 299 F. 899, 901-02 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
117. In Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900),, the railway questioned
whether the Kentucky law requiring racially separate coaches was an "infringement upon the
exclusive power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce." Id. at 390. The Court cited Pessy
as authority regarding the construction of a state statute so as not to interfere with interstate
commerce. Id. at 395.
Chiles v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 218 U.S. 71 (1910), raised the question whether an interstate
passenger could be subjected to Kentucky's requirement of segregated carriages on the in-state
portion of his journey. The Court characterized the railway's regulation as "the act of a private
person" making "the distinction between state and interstate commerce...unimportant." Id. at 75.
Plessy was then cited for the reasonableness of the regulation. "Regulations which are induced by
the general sentiment of the community for whom they are made and upon whom they operate
cannot be said to be unreasonable." Id. at 77 (citing Plessy, 163 U.S. 540). But c. Washington,
B.& A. Elec. R.R. v. Waller, 289 F. 598, 601-03 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (lack of evidence that railroad
had any properly promulgated regulation calling for in-state segregation of interstate passengers).
118. For example, Pessy was not even cited in the federal case upholding the requirement of
segregated schooling for Chinese students in California. See Wong Him v. Callahan, 119 F. 381,
382 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1902). "When the schools are conducted under the same general rules, and
the course of study is the same in one school as in the other, it cannot be said that pupils in
either are deprived of the equal protection of the law in the matter of receiving an education."
Id. at 382.
119. During the forty-year period from its inception up to the beginning of its undermining
in Missouri ex rd. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), Pessy was cited by the Court in only
eleven cases. The five cases in which Pessy was used substantively are discussed in notes 116 &
117 supra and in notes 120-21 & 123 infra. The balance of the cases involved no element of racial
discrimination. The citations to Pessy were either for general propositions, such as reasonable state
regulation is not violative of equal protection, or were merely for filler in long strings of cases to
illustrate even more general propositions.
120. McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 160 (1914). Although the
statement purports to be a reiteration of the conclusions of the court below, the verbal formula of
"separate, but equal" is nowhere to be found in either the majority or dissenting opinions of the
Court of Appeals. McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 186 F. 966, 969-70 (8th Cir.
1911) (majority); id. at 980-81 (Sanborn, J., dissenting). Note that the dissent placed considerable
emphasis on the necessity that the separate facilities be equal. Id.
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the Court found that, since the separate facilities were not equal, the challenged
regulation did not meet the equal protection standard.' 2' Thus, subsequent cases
are typically necessary to bring the rule to clearer statement. The Plessy rule
had to be stated before it could be used. That statement is also part of the
process of development of the case's rationale. Later cases were decided by
applying and restating the rationale of Plessy in conjunction with other relevant
constitutional standards. 22 As that rationale evolved, it eventually provided the
basis for a seemingly automatic application of the rule of separate but equal.
In that elaborated state, it was fit for application to broader realms. Finally,
more than thirty years after Plessy, the rule was first applied in an education
23
case, albeit in a manner which the Court presented as a foregone conclusion.
That nearly automatic application was possible because the details of the rationale had been worked out sufficiently that one might say overoptimistically
that the gestalt was complete.
But what is the fate of the Plessy gestalt? In an oversimple view, Plessy was
a rule for almost sixty years. Suddenly, it was overruled in 1954. In what Hart
would describe as another legislative act, the Court in Brown v. Board of Education
overruled Plessy in the field of pubic education. 24 The Supreme Court, however,
had been ruling adversely to segregated education for almost twenty years prior
to Brown. 25 In those cases, the Court purported to apply the "separate but
equal" rule of Plessy, while ruling consistently for the plaintiff. The Court always
found that governments were failing to provide equal facilities. As it happened,
those cases dealt largely with legal education. The first cases presented the issue
whether a state satisfied the separate but equal rule by providing out-of-state
tuition scholarships for black students in the absence of facilities for blacks within
121.
The challenged Oklahoma "separate coach law" permitted the railroads to omit providing
any "luxury" facilities such as dining cars and sleeping cars for black patrons. Speaking for the
Court, Mr. Justice Hughes stated:
[I]f facilities are provided, substantial equality of treatment of persons traveling under like
conditions cannot be refused. It is the individual who is entitled to the equal protection
of the laws, and if he is denied by a common carrier, acting in the matter under the
authority of a state law, a facility or convenience in the course of his journey which, under
substantially the same circumstances, is furnished to another traveler, he may properly
complain that his constitutional privilege has been invaded.
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914).
122. In view of its modest beginnings, Plessy is treated as possessing amazing authority by
Chief Justice Taft. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 86 (1927) (discussed infra note 123).
123. The case presented the challenge of a Chinese girl to exclusion from the white schools
of Mississippi.
Were this a new question, it would call for very full argument and consideration; but we
think that it is the same question which has been many times decided to be within the
constitutional power of the state Legislature to settle, without intervention of the federal
courts under the federal Constitution.
Id. at 85-86. Taft went on to cite Plessy, calling its transportation issue "a more difficult question
than this." Id.
124. "[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,

495 (1954).
125. The beginning of the undermining of Plessy in Missouri ex ret. Gaines v. Canada, 305
U.S. 337 (1938), came only eleven years after the first and only previous education case in which
Plessy was cited.
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the state.' 2 6 To avoid such a ruling, the state of Texas built a beautiful new
law school exclusively for blacks at what is now known as Texas Southern
University in Houston. Texas claimed these facilities had to be considered equal.
The Court, however, ruled that facilities pale in comparison to "those qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in
a law school.'

27

The ambiance of a great law school was missing: "[T]he

1 28
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is concerned.
The question arises, after almost twenty years of such rulings, whether Plessy
should still be considered good law. Hart would say that Plessy continued to
state the rule. Separate but equal was the established rule, and anything changing it would be an act of overruling. According to Hart, such an act would
be judicial legislation. Even though the separate but equal rule may not be
morally defensible, it would still be law. Does this reasoning, however, reflect
the process by which judgments in law are made? For those working in the
civil rights field, Plessy's demise was simply a matter of time. 29 Plessy had not
been applied in a way favorable to segregationist interests for a very long time.
Suppose that someone claimed that segregationist interests would prevail in a
given case, because the separate but equal rule validated the state's action. Any
informed observer of the judicial development would respond that the persuasive
force of Plessy had been vitiated by an accumulation of decisions adverse to its
rationale.
Realistically, PLessy is no longer quite law, and Brown is trivialized by the
epithet legislation. A more accurate understanding of how law operates is available in the picture of the decline of some rules and the rise of other rules to
replace them in an ongoing evolutionary process of persuasive moral argument.
That picture is fashioned with the materials of the middle-of-the-road positions
of Pound, Cardozo, and Fuller. 30 Such advocacy of moral argument also characterizes the more recent contributions of Perelman and Dworkin.'2 ' The evolutionary picture provides an example of how judicial decisionmaking may be

126.

Missouri ex rel. Canada v. Gaines, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), celebrated Plessy's fortieth an-

niversary by relying heavily on McCabe, stating: "[T]he State was bound to furnish him within
its borders facilities for legal education substantially equal to those which the State there afforded
for persons of the white race, whether or not other negroes sought the same opportunity." Gaines,
305 U.S. at 351. The case was followed in Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (per
curiam).
127. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950).
128. Id. at 634. The Court added that the petitioner had a right to "legal education equivalent
to that offered by the State to students of other races. Such education is not available to him in
a separate law school." Id. at 635. In the companion case of McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents
for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950), a black graduate student was required to sit on a special
row in the classroom, to study at a special table in the library, and to eat at a special table in
the cafeteria. The Court commented, "[t]he result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit
of effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, to engage
in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in general, to learn his profession."
Id. at 641.
129.
130.
131.

Cf. R. KLUGCER, supra note 110, at 282-84.
See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
See generally R DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 81-130, 248-53, 279-90.
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rethought in such a way as to avoid both the abyss of skeptical uncertainty
and the shackles of conceptualism.
IV.

JUDICIAL DECISION AS PARADIGM

The process of rethinking, however, is incomplete. One might wish to rest
content, hoping to avoid the twin traps of rigid rules and amoral anarchy. To
the literalist the denial of the permanence of rules will be alarming. To the
cynic the assertion of the normality of order will be foolhardy. For those unwilling to accede to either extreme, more exploration remains. The picture of
the rise and fall of rules is satisfactory as far as it goes. Yet it is inadequate
to convey the complexities of the relationship between major shifts from one
rule to another and the routine contour adjustment within a rule that obviously
occupies the major portion of judicial energies. The notion of paradigm may
provide a helpful metaphor for that purpose. The use of the expression "paradigm case" has become a common one for the typical or standard instance
of an idea.1 32 That meaning of the term is not helpful in the search for metaphor.
But Thomas Kuhn's notion of scientific paradigms does provide promise of
illuminating how the structure of legal decision interrelates with the process of
legal persuasion. Kuhn himself found inspiration in judicial reasoning. He stated
"a paradigm .... like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, is an
object for further articulation and specification under new or more stringent
conditions."' 33 An examination of paradigms may be useful, therefore, in increasing understanding of the judicial use of rules.
A.

Viewing Rules as Paradigms

A paradigm is a particular set of assumptions with which to view the world.
Like a topos in legal argument, it provides a context for argument. Once that
set of assumptions is accepted, the starting place need not be reexamined.
Instead, standard scientific investigation can be efficiently pursued within the
confines of that paradigm. Scientists work within the governing paradigm of
their disciplines to solve routine problems. Kuhn labels that process normal
science.' 34 As time goes on, however, problems accumulate that are insoluble
within the parameters of the assumptions that constitute the reigning paradigm.
Scientists try to ignore these problems. "Normal science," Kuhn says, "often
suppresses fundamental novelties because they are necessarily subversive of its
basic commitments.' ' 35 Those fundamental novelties are of interest only in time
132. E.g., H. HART, supra note 16, at 125 ("[UjIcar examples of what is certainly within its
scope . . . are the paradigm, clear cases.").
133. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 23 (2d ed. 1970).
134. The conduct of "normal science" in law is aptly illustrated by a proportion of undissented
appellate opinions that would dismay any legal existentialist. Judge Ginsburg reports that, in 198384, "ninety-four percent of our 355 published opinions, issued initially without dissent " Ginsburg,
supra note 96, at 212. A further illustration of the routine nature of much appellate judicial work ts
reflected in the fact that the circuits choose such a modest percentage of their opinions as worthy
of publication. Last year's figure for the D.C. Circuit was 67%. Id. at 213.
135. T. KUHN, supra note 133, at 5.
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of breakup between paradigms. Breakup occurs when the tension caused by the
accumulation of insoluble problems becomes sufficiently great to undermine the
plausibility of the governing paradigm.
This period of scientific revolution is an interregnum in which participants
are forced to question their basic assumptions. As a result, science is unsettled
because no one agrees on the right way of looking at things. Kuhn offers as
an example of the period between paradigms, when thinkers are searching for
what Perelman would call a new topos, the field of physical optics before Newton.
Common beliefs were not shared in the field of physical optics. Hence, each
writer of that era started afresh from the beginning. 136 The result of such efforts
was a considerable volume of basic theory. But little of the problem-solving
work associated with normal science was produced. The reason for this failure
is that each scientist was doing basic theorizing, endeavoring to formulate a
plausible paradigm.

37

The revolutionary period is a period of exploration of new possible paradigms. The alternatives compete for attention, and the more persuasive one
will eventually succeed and become dominant. But surely, one may object, the
winner would be determined by nature and logic. Kuhn, however, asserts that
equally crucial is the kind of persuasive argumentation that is also involved in
judicial decisionmaking.'

38

Prevailing is a matter of persuasion. 139 The more

persuasive paradigm will become dominant, and it will remain dominant as
routine problems are solved within its confines." 4 In addition, when a paradigm
emerges, scientists can "agree in their identification of a paradigm without agreeing on, or even attempting to produce, a full interpretation or rationalization of
it. Lack of a standard interpretation or of an agreed reduction to rules will
not prevent a paradigm from guiding research.' 4' The paradigm still provides
guidance because what is crucial is not the detail but the set of fundamental
assumptions which provides a reasonably consistent way of viewing reality.
Those fundamental assumptions in fact constitute the paradigm. As with
topos and argument, paradigm and persuasion are intimately linked. Indeed,
Kuhn ascribes a central place to the role of persuasion. 4 2 Such arguments, in

136. See id. at 13.
137. Id.
138. Kuhn comments that "anyone examining a survey of physical optics before Newton might
well conclude that, though the field's practitioners were scientists, the net result of their activity

was something less than science." Id. at 94.
139. Persuasion requires the giving of reasons in judicial argument. See Ginsburg, supra note
96. Moreover, it is the process of argumentation that generates the necessity of "[r]etreat, accommodation, compromise." Id. at 212.
140. However, minority schools sometimes may continue to function alongside the dominant
school.
141. T. KUHN, supra note 133, at 44 (emphasis in original).
142. To understand why science develops as it does, one need not unravel the details of
biography and personality that lead each individual to a particular choice, though that
topic has vast fascination. What one must understand, however, is the manner in which
a particular set of shared values interacts with the particular experiences shared by a
community of specialists to ensure that most members of the group will ultimately find

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 3
326

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVII

turn, depend upon the shared values (topoi) of the community. The consensus,
however, cannot endure forever. The assumptions that constitute the paradigm
are called into question. Eventually, the new paradigm reaches a point at which
the accumulation of too many unsolvable problems causes tension. When such
a paradigm begins to break down, it exhibits several signals:
The proliferation of competing articulations, the willingness to try anything, the expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy
and to debate over fundamentals, all these are symptoms of a transition
from normal to extraordinary research. It is upon their existence, more
than upon that of revolutions, that the notion of normal science depends. 4'
Kuhn's portrait of science provides a picture suggestive of the way that
fundamental legal ideas come into being, live a life, and die out. But an accurate
picture of that process is not available in terms as concrete as the core notion
of rules. The core of the rule suggests a permanence that is unreal. The core
does, however, provide a convenient shorthand, a paradigm, for treating certain
kinds of situations in a particular sort of way. As long as satisfaction with the
application of accepted values to the situation continues, the paradigm remains
useful. 44 But when other factors introduce themselves, the persuasive power of
the old paradigm begins to erode. The search for an alternative begins. Eventually, a new one must emerge. Many examples in law demonstrate such a
paradigm process at work. The evolution first of Plessy and then of Brown are
good instances. Because the previous discussion of that history may be readily
reanalyzed in paradigm terms, consideration of other available examples provides opportunity for additional insight.
B.

Normal Paradigms: The Case of the Smart Con

One of the clearest examples is the development by the Supreme Court of
the right to appointed counsel. Betts v. Brady, decided in 1942, held the federal
Constitution did not guarantee counsel in state felony cases unless special circumstances made the appointment of counsel necessary to assure the fundamental fairness of the trial. 1 45 Imagine a young lawyer, recently graduated from
law school, who obtains a position with the Attorney General of Florida. The
one set of arguments rather than another decisive. That process is persuasion.

Id. at 200.
143. Id. at 91.
144. The utility of the paradigm derives from its very constraining quality which in judicial
explication of the law tends to encourage modest developments. Ginsburg, supra note 96, at (quoting
Friendly, Reactions of a Lawyer - Newly Become a Judge, 71 YALE L.J. 218, 222-23 (1961)).
145. [T]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose
trial is offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of fairness and rights, and while
want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental
fairness, we cannot say that the amendment embodies an inexorable command that no
trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a
defendant who is not represented by counsel.
Betts v. Brady, 326 U.S. 455, 473 (1942).
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case he is assigned involves a crank named Gideon from Panama City. Gideon
is incarcerated in the Florida State Prison and has filed a pro se habeas corpus
petition. He claims that he is illegally imprisoned because the state denied him
appointed counsel at his trial.
How does the young lawyer defend Florida in the Supreme Court? A rule
governs the situation, and the rule seems clear. Betts has not been overruled;
it should be good law. The young lawyer can therefore defend his case on the
ground that Gideon, as demonstrated by his pro se petition, is a smart fellow
and that no special circumstances trigger the Betts exception. Indeed, Gideon
does not allege any special circumstances requiring counsel in his case. By his
own admission, he falls within the rule of Betts. How then can Gideon hope
to prevail? He ignores Betts entirely. Instead, he claims a right to counsel exists
in every felony case without regard to the presence of special circumstances.
Gideon, however, is only the initial opponent. When the case is actually
heard, Gideon will not personally argue the case against the young Florida
lawyer. The Court will appoint counsel to argue for Gideon. In this case,
appointed counsel will be Abe Fortas, one of the very best Washington lawyers. 146 But the young lawyer has the law on his side. The rule favors Florida.
To overrule Betts, the Court would have to make a legislative choice. Surely,
such precipitous action is unlikely. However, when the young lawyer begins to
study the cases, he discovers that for the past thirteen years the Court has
typically taken one or two right to counsel cases each term. Although the Court
has never overruled Betts v. Brady, in every case for the past thirteen years it
147
has found special circumstances.
Imagine that the young lawyer in his worry consults Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin is after all the most noted current propounder of a theory of precedent. A
central element of that theory is the distinction between the gravitational force
of a precedent and its enactment force. 14 The gravitational force is the moral
power of attractiveness a decision has for the decision of similar cases. The
enactment force, on the other hand, is simply the strict authority a decision
has for cases of the same facts: Cases the decision is said to govern. When
the rationale of the case can be extended to other cases by analogy, only the
gravitational force would so apply. The enactment force has no such extension.
It is nothing more than the rule of the case. In Hart's language, the enactment
force of a precedent is the core meaning of the rule stated by that case. The
purpose of Dworkin's distinction is to show that when the persuasiveness of
precedent is cut back, it is the gravitational force that is reduced. As it loses
the weight it had previously commanded, its gravitational force diminishes until
149
only the enactment force remains.
How would Dworkin advise the worried young lawyer? He would likely
remark that he very much regrets for the lawyer's sake that Betts appears to
146. A. LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 48-56 (1964) (a delightful account of the entire proceedings
in the Gideon case).
147. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 60 (5th ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as Y. KAMisAR].
148. R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 110-15.
149. Id. at 111-13, 121-22.
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have retained little gravitational force. The Supreme Court has not been sincerely impressed by the principle of Betts, since it has found special circumstances
in every case. Dworkin can, however, offer some consolation to the young
lawyer. Even though the gravitational force may have ebbed away entirely, Betts
retains its enactment force as a rule until the Court overrules it. The young
lawyer still has a rule to argue to the Court, a rule that governs the case. Its
loss of gravitational force means only that Betts has no more persuasive power.
Its rationale can no longer influence other cases. 50 Because it retains its enactment force, however, it keeps its legal standing as a valid rule.
The young lawyer finds, however, that Dworkin's consolation is of little
avail. Though "special circumstances" still has technical standing as a rule,
that is no inhibition to a unanimous Supreme Court which unceremoniously
pronounces Betts dead on arrival. According to Dworkin, the enactment force
of Betts is not cut off until the Justices act. Thus, a residual element in Dworkin's theory resembles Hart's core meaning of a rule. A rule is still a rule
5
until it is overruled in an act of judicial legislation.' '
Viewing law in this manner is unhelpful. A more realistic view would recognize the rule had lost its power before the court pronounced it dead. To
claim that this rule had its enactment force up until the second before the Court
signed its death certificate is naive. 5 2 Lawyers do not look at cases that way.
Anyone advising the young lawyer about the state of the law at that point
would say the chance of persuading the Court not to overrule Betts is virtually
nonexistent. The Court will certainly not be swayed by the argument that Betts
is the law, the enacted rule. 5 3 Under the circumstances, its rationale is so
vitiated, so completely eaten away that even the shell of the rule may not
remain. -4
The young lawyer is therefore in the position that, in order to defend the
case successfully, he cannot rely on the rule. He must reexamine the fundamental rationale and try to persuade the court that all those previous cases
foreshadowing the rejection of Betts were mistaken. He must return to fundamental assumptions to mount persuasive arguments that the values behind Betts
are worth preserving. Unless he does that, he will be unable to persuade the
Court, because the Court has already been making up its collective mind.
150. "[Hie does not deny its specific authority but he does deny its gravitational force, and
he cannot consistently appeal to that force in other arguments." Id. at 121.
151.
"If an earlier decision [had] no gravitational force, its value as a precedent would be
limited to its enactment force, that is, to further cases captured by some particular words of the
opinion." Id. at 113.
152. See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. REv. 211, 225,
269.
153. The loss of support for Betts is dramatized in the fact that only two states supported Florida's
position. Twenty-two states implored the Court to overrule Betts. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
345 (1963). The amicus position of the Attorneys General against state rights was highly unusual.
The campaign to do so was originated by the young Attorney General of Minnesota, Walter
Mondale. See A. LEwis, supra note 146, at 145-54. Lewis explains that a twenty-third state was
inadvertently omitted and later added. Id. at 148.
154. Kamisar, LaFave & Israel ask rhetorically: "After Chewning [the last 'special circumstances'
case prior to Gideon], what was left of Betts to overrule?" Y. KAMISAR, supra note 147, at 61.
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At this point, very little, if any, persuasion is necessary to overrule Bells.
The Court is ready to recognize the reality that it has already created. The
special circumstances rule has no more vitality. Though it may appear to be
the rule, it no longer has credibility. Indeed, if a lower court judge were to
rely affirmatively on it at this point, that judge would likely be criticized for
excessive legalism and ridiculed for lacking insight into the emerging constitutional standard. Gideon v. Wainwright'5 5 announced the official end of the Betts
paradigm. At that point the Gideon paradigm officially began. What remains is
the routine legal work of figuring out the details of the scope of the new
,,rule. 1 5 6
C. A Frozen Paradigm: The Case of the Addict with Status
The picture of law portrayed by Betts' demise, however, merits an important
qualification. Law does not always follow such a bell curve in its pattern of
development. The downfall of Betts was so complete that the notion of its tenuous
enactment force becomes comic. Other paradigms, however, may linger on
indefinitely, in states of -tremely frail health. In some cases, Dworkin's gravitational force may have oozed away entirely, while apparent enactment force
remains. Some paradigms linger on for a long time, while others are cut off
in their prime. In either case, the paradigm may be thought of as frozen in
time. It is not dead, but its animation is definitely suspended.
Robinson v. California5 7 is an interesting example. The Court there held that
imprisoning a narcotics addict for the status of being an addict constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. Many civil libertarians welcomed this powerful new
weapon to convert the punishment of criminal offenses into the treatment of
socio-medical problems.'58 In their eyes, Robinson established a fantastic new rule

155.

372 U.S. 335. The Court considered its decision sufficiently obvious to be given full retrospective

effect. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628 n.13, 639 n.20 (1965).
156. For materials on the scope of the right to appointed counsel and related assistance, see
Y. KAmISAR, supra note 147, at 65-179. Those materials illustrate that working out the details of
the scope of the rule is more complicated than the statement in the text would suggest. That
complexity is due to the need to develop the new rule in the context of a number of other evolving
rules, all of which interact in the process of elaboration.
157. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
158. The decision was hailed by Neibel:
The Court has set its face against those who are content to imprison the addict and not
to cure the disease. In the long run, as congress and the legislatures intelligently diagnose
the nature of this social illness the greatest implication of the decision will be realized: A
modern, civil and successful treatment of this sad, sick segment of our people.
Niebel, Implications of Robinson v. California, I Hous. L. REv. 1, 11 (1963). McMorris concluded
that the addicts "must now be either let alone or, better, treated by physicians, psychiatrists, and
social engineers for their sickness." McMorris, The Decriminalization of Narcotics Addiction, 3 AM.
GRIM. L.Q. 84, 86 (1964). Logan interpreted Robinson as meaning that "[t]he punishment by
criminal process of persons apprehended only because they are sick must cease in American courts."
Logan, May a Man Be Punished Because He Is I1?, 52 A.B.A. J. 932, 932 (1966). Asimow saw that
"the addiction statute - without explicit provision for treatment-is now extinct." Asimow, Punishment for Narcotic Addiction Held Cruel and Unusual, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 219, 228 (1963).
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to aid the therapeutic approach to a better life.' 5 9 Within a few years, they
brought Powell v. Texas to the Supreme Court.' 6° Powell had been convicted for
public drunkenness. His lawyers, however, claimed that Powell's conviction was
unconstitutional, because he was in essence being punished for the status of
being an alcoholic.' 6' They argued that Robinson should apply, because the difference between the status of being an alcoholic and the status of being an
addict is inconsequential.' 62 Robinson should invalidate laws punishing such drun63
kenness. 1
Four members of the Supreme Court were willing to accept that argument,'64
but five were not, 65 including some who had been members of the majority
in Robinson.' 66 They rethought the implications of Robinson and were persuaded
159. The Executive Director of the North American Judges Association perceived Robinson to
mean that "American judges must set [the sick person] free from criminal prosecution." Logan,
supra note 158, at 932. The case was based on the principle that it is "obviously unjust to punish
a human being for the sole reason that he is already suffering." Id. The lawyer who represented
Robinson in the Supreme Court, Samuel Carter McMorris, whose position of advocacy is nowhere
disclosed in the Article nor in the Quarterly, saw Robinson's overdose death prior to entry of the
decision of the Court as making
him a martyr to the cause of justice for the unhappy class of which he was a part. Perhaps
had he been able to come to the community for understanding, treatment, humanity, he
would not have had to continue his resort to the underworld purveyors of the medicine
his body cried out for, and he might be alive today.
McMorris, supra note 158, at 88. Another writer saw Robinson adopting the British therapeutic
approach and concluded "[t]he impact of the decision should be to direct the states toward both
a more effective and humanitarian treatment of drug addiction, and to serve as a general warning
that no state may constitutionally ignore the findings of medical science in the construction of its
criminal law."

Bagalay, Penal Sanctions Applied to Narcotics Addiction Are Unconstitutional as Cruel and

Unusual Punishment, 41 TEx. L. Rev. 444, 448 (1963).
160. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
161. "Students of constitutional law immediately saw in Robinson the eventual application of
this principle to other addicts, and particularly to the alcoholic." Logan, supra note 158, at 932.
See also id. at 936-37. Martin reflected a common attitude toward the problem in stating "[a]lcoholism
is a disease and it is impossible to believe that a rational person would voluntarily incur it."
Martin, Alcoholism as a Defense to a Charge of Public Drunkenness-Implications, 4 Hous. L. Rav. 276,

278 (1966).
162. Asimow commented, "[tlhe wind from Robinson could topple statutes in the area of
alcoholism, which, considered as a disease, presents problems analogous to those of addiction."
Asimow, supra note 158, at 227. Bagalay thought it likely that Robinson would lead to "a review
of the application of criminal sanctions to such medically fertile fields as homosexuality and alcoholism." Bagalay, supra note 159, at 448. Martin considered it "obvious" that Robinson meant that
the punishment of a chronic alcoholic would be unconstitutional. Martin, supra note 161, at 276.
163. Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Driver v. Hinnant, 356
F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966). Martin thought that "[t]he question of prosecution of the alcoholic for
public drunkenness seems settled. The problem of prosecution for related compelled offenses must
soon be faced." Martin, supra note 161, at 290. Logan found that "[tjhe continued criminal
incarceration of the alcoholic is a national disgrace." Logan, supra note 158, at 933. Robinson was
the answer, because from now on a "citizen cannot be incarcerated by reason of being addicted
to a drug (alcohol is a narcotic)." Id. at 935.
164. Powell, 392 U.S. at 554 (Fortas, Douglas, Brennan & Stewart, JJ., dissenting).
165. Id. at 514 (Marshall, Black, Harlan, J.J., & Warren, C.J.); id. at 537 (Black & Harlan,
J.J., concurring); id. at 548 (White, J., concurring in result).
166. Justices Black and Harlan and Chief Justice Warren were members of the majority in
Robinson who were also in the majority in Powell. Justices Stewart, Brennan and Douglas were the
other members of the Robinson majority. Justices Fortas and Marshall joined the Court in the
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by the ad absurdum argument. That argument challenges the judge to draw the
line. If punishment for the status of being an addict were outlawed, criminal
67
defendants could argue that their addictions compelled them to buy narcotics.
Laws forbidding purchase and sale cannot apply to the addict, because that
would be indirect punishment of the status.168 If the vice of status crimes is

their involuntary character, the addict could claim exemption for the crimes
committed to get the money to buy narcotics. His status compelled him to
snatch the purse. Unless indirect punishment of the involuntary status is permissible, the addict must be allowed A.his defense. 69 The Court in Powell clearly
decided the ad absurdum argument was indeed a slippery slope. As a result, it
cut back to the bare bones of Robinson without overruling it.
In that regard, Powell is unlike both Gideon and Brown, in each of which
one paradigm completely replaced another. Robinson was simply cut short. It
may be considered frozen. It is preserved, as if encased in some futuristic
cryogenics cylinder, for museum-like display to future generations. The difference is that frozen rules may occasionally be revived. A frozen rule remains,
but it is so confined to its facts that it appears to retain no gravitational force.
Robinson is an appropriate case in which to recognize enactment force as an
accurate description of the present state of the law, since it appears to retain
some limited authority. Moreover, the possibility remains that its gravitational
force may thaw in the remote future, presumably when reprogramming has
replaced punishment as the principal technique for coping with social problems:'70 In contrast, Belts retained little, if any, enactment force just before the
guillotine fell.
One consequence of thinking of law as a dynamic process is that the status
of a rule is never set until the courts have finished with it. The problem with
enactment force, however, is that it seems to be a concession to Hart's notion
interim between the cases. Justices White and Clark dissented in Robinson.
167. The constitutionality of this particular question [criminal sanctions for the "use" of
narcotics] was not before the Court, but the rationale for what the Court did hold seems
to apply with equal force to those laws which proscribe the act of using narcotics. If the
constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment precludes treating the addict as a
criminal, then it makes no sense to permit the states to treat as criminal the conduct of
an addict--which [is] only symptomatic of his disease.
Bagalay, supra note 159, at 446. Accord, Martin, supra note 161, at 284.
168. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Wright, J., dissenting).
Martin argued that "[iJn discussing alcoholism as a defense one may not avoid the obvious analogy
to drug addiction as a defense to prosecution for the illegal use of drugs." Martin, supra note 161,
at 279. McMorris thought that "[n]arcotics use in clinics, under state supervision, may be what
we ultimately need to enforce the spirit of Robinson." McMorris, supra note 158, at 88. See also
Amsterdam, Criminal Law Today and Tomorrow, 9 HAwAti B.J. 31, 35, 38 (1972).
169. United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Cf. Martin, supra note 161, at 291 (If "the offense was compelled,
no criminal liability should attach.").
170. Martin captures the ideal well. "Society and the individual alcoholic will benefit most
from a dynamic civil commitment program the objective of which is treatment and rehabilitation
of all alcoholics who come before the court." Martin, supra note 161, at 291. Asimow saw Robinson
as compelling "a state that wants to deal with addiction to do so by treatment." Asimow, supra
note 158, at 225. See Criminals Should be Cured, Not Caged, 6 Am.

CRiuM.

L.Q. 133, 138 (1968)

("genuine rehabilitation").
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of the core meaning. Such concretizing of the rule is disturbing, because it is
inconsistent with the middle-view of law as a process of moral argument. Its
intent seems to be to hide the metaphorical quality of rule or enactment force.
Organic (and, therefore, dynamic) metaphors are less likely to deceive. Hence,
the safest manner in which to speak of rules is in such terms as healthy, sick,
dying, or dead. Dworkin defines enactment force as the core of the rule that
is left after all of the gravitational force is gone. At that point, resuscitation is
required for the rule to become viable again. The process of argumentation
would be needed to breathe new life into its rationale.
That qualification does not imply that, properly understood within the structure of moral argumentation, the notion of enactment force does not have its
uses. As in Robinson, a state of suspended animation is possible in which the
rule remains confined to its particular facts for perhaps an indefinite period of
time. It remains in that limbo because no other technique of handling that
particular problem seems appealing at the moment. At the same time, it is a
true case of enactment force, for the rule is not seen as a suitable source from
which to draw inspiration to solve similar problems. Indeed, determining which
problems are similar when a rule is so disfavored is difficult. That difficulty
arises from the attempt to separate the rule from its rationale. But it is precisely
this separation of the rationale, i.e., Dworkin's gravitational force, from the
core or enactment force of the rule that creates the illusion that a rule's enactment force is merely a matter of automatic application. The misfortune of
that suggestion is the notion that the legal task can be performed without
examination of the rationale of the rule in order to know whether a particular
situation falls within it. If the lifeblood of legal development is moral argument,
the assertion of an unqualified notion of enactment force represents a significant
case of arteriosclerosis.
D.

An Aborted Paradigm: The Case of the Death Penalty That Could not Die

The frozen paradigm is not the only available category of non-normal paradigm. Another sort could be called the aborted or truncated paradigm, a good
example of which is provided by the death penalty cases. Those cases constitute
the culmination of numerous assaults on the death penalty. 71' Over the years,
some of those attacks were partially successful;

72

others were not.' 7 3 Eventually,

however, the crusade culminated in the apparent success 174 of Furman v. Geor171.

For a survey of the history of the challenge to capital punishment, see Caswell, Capital
TRIAL May-June 1974, at 47.
172. E.g., Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (death sentence is invalid if imposed
by "death qualified" jury).
173. E.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (lack of standards to guide jury
discretion in imposing death sentence is not unconstitutional).
174. To the movement to abolish capital punishment, its victory at the Supreme Court
in
June 1972 was the culmination of a nine-year legal battle. Engineered by the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, the protracted struggle was hailed by Fund literature as "the closest
thing to a full-scale military operation that US courts are likely to see."
Caswell, supra note 171, at 47.

Punishment: Cementing A Fragile Victoy,
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gia.'7 5 At that point, the crusaders thought they had won. 76 At the same time,
however, a backlash against crime led to a sudden surge of support for capital
punishment.' 7" This grassroots swell led a number of jurisdictions to enact new
death penalty statutes in an attempt to meet the rigorous procedural require78
ments of Furman.
A majority of the Court in Furman probably thought those procedural standards had made the death penalty too difficult and that Furman would therefore
effectively end capital punishment.'7 9 Instead, the Court faced the capital punishment issue again in Gregg v. Georgia.'" This time, however, the issue was
175. -Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
176. Former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg hailed Furman as "a great step forward
in the Court's and our country's history." Goldberg, Vie Death Penalty and the Supreme Court, 15
ARmz. L. REV. 355, 366 (1973). Another writer said the time had come to accept "the apparently
inevitable end of capital punishment as a feature of our legal system ... [for] all signs point to
the impending death of capital punishment." Cobb, Bastard or Legitimate Child of Furman? An Analysis
of Wyoming's New Capital Punishment Law, 9 LAND & WATER L. REV. 209, 235-36 (1974). Professor
Harold Levinson, writing with several associates, considered it "unlikely that a constitutional capital
punishment statute can be enacted" because Furman "strongly implies that capital punishment in
the United States is a thing of the past." Ehrhardt, Hubbart, Levinson, Smiley & Wills, The Future
of Capital Punishment in Florida: Analysis and Recommendations, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 2, 6-7 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Ehrhardt]. McDonald stated:
The decision was at once unprecedented yet the result of a clear abolitionist trend at almost
every level of the system of criminal justice of the United States. The decision was surprising, unexpected, an apparently radical break with our history, but it was also a decision
whose time was irresistably (sic) at hand.
McDonald, Capital Punishment in South Carolina: The End of an Era, 24 S.C.L. REv. 762 (1972).
177. Comment, Capital Punishment After Furman, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 281, 288 n.98 (1973),
noted an increase in approval of capital punishment as reflected in public opinion polls: 1966,
42%; 1969, 51%; 1972, 66%. That development would have been appreciated by Levi who stated:
"The process is one in which the ideas of the community and of the social sciences, whether
correct or not, as they win acceptance in the community, control legal decisions. Erroneous ideas,
of course, have played an enormous part in shaping the law." E. LEvi, supra note 73, at 6. See
also Bennett, Rehabilitation in Check, TRIAL, Mar. 1976, at 12.
No doubt one reason for the sudden popularity of the retribution rationale is the growing
fear of crime on the streets. Along with this is the belief, long held by many, that we
have been too soft on criminals. This has been the cry of hard-liner conservatives for a
long time. Today many liberals find themselves leaning, if not moving, in that direction.
Id. at 12.
178. Goldberg details some of the backlash in both public opinion and state legislative responses.
See Goldberg, supra note 176, at 367. A critique of the Florida legislative response is provided by
Ehrhardt & Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response: An Exercise in Futility?, 64 J. CRIM. L. & C. 10
(1973). See generally Ehrhardt, supra note 176. Cobb stated: "[T]he states believe their citizens want
the death penalty. At one time, this was enough to justify any reasonable death penalty statute.
But Furman leaves no doubt that, constitutionally, it will not be enough in the future." Cobb,
supra note 176, at 235.
179. Goldberg indicated that he had considered it "extremely doubtful that the death penalty
would be legislatively reviewed on the mandatory and even-handed basis which might meet the
[constitutional] objections." Goldberg, supra note 176, at 366. McDonald stated: "The time has
now come for the State frankly to acknowledge that the death penalty has been relegated to our
history." McDonald, supra note 176, at 794. Another writer opined: "This reevaluation will undoubtedly result in the repeal of even those mandatory death penalty statutes presently employed by
many jurisdictions." Comment, Furman v. Georgia-DeathknelforCapital Punishment?, 47 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 107, 147 (1972) (emphasis added).
180. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
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more difficult, because the Court had to decide whether the new statutes framed
specifically to meet the Furman criteria would pass constitutional muster.
Confronted directly with the issue in the context of a popular outcry, a
majority of the Court backed off from the stronger stance of Furman. As a
result, the Court found itself approving the state statutes, for the most part,
as meeting the requirements that had been established in Furman. Ironically,
the Court found itself endorsing the death penalty as constitutional after all.
The apparent beginning of a new paradigm in Furman was sharply truncated
into a relatively modest set of procedural requirements specified in Gregg. All
that remains of Furman's promise is the nostalgic reminder of that era found
in the routine dissents by Justices Brennan and Marshall in all death penalty
cases. They continually adhere to their dissents in Gregg, reiterating "the death
penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 8
The position now, of course, looks much different than it did at the time
of Furman. Death penalty opponents then felt they had a new paradigm emerging
on the subject. 82 They no doubt hoped that it would have a long and healthy
life, and they waited impatiently for the Court to pronounce the final sentence
8 3
on the death penalty.
Furman's proponents were, however, disappointed by Gregg. Although the
new paradigm sometimes prospers, in other cases it does not. Argumentation
makes legal development an experimental process in which a rule is tried out
along with an assessment of the arguments composing its rationale.8 4 Sometimes

181.
E.g., De La Rosa v. Procunier, 105 S. Ct. 2353, 2353 (1985) (Brennan & Marshall,
JJ., dissenting to the denial of application for stay of execution).
182. E.g., Junker, The Death Penalty Cases: A Preliminary Comment, 48 WASH. L. REv. 95, 95
(1972) ("The next to last step down the long road to total abolition of capital punishment consists
of a period during which the death penalty is retained as an official symbol but repealed in
practice."). Junker went on to remark that, as a result of Furman, "the hanging tree" is "already
dead." Id. Comment, Furman v. Georgia: Will The Death of Capital Punishment Mean a New Life
For Bail?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REv. 432, 432-33 (1974), said that Furman "has effectively abolished capital
punishment in the United States for the time being." Cf. McDonald, supra note 176, at 762 (believed
the public had acquiesced in Furman's "abolishing the death penalty").
183. Irvin & Rose, The Response to Furman: Can Legislators Breathe Life Back into Death?, 23
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 172 (1974), considered it "unlikely that the Supreme Court, after releasing
over six hundred prisoners from death row, would permit the reinstatement of capital punishment
in any form." Id. at 189. Accord Ehrhardt, supra note 176, at 7. McDonald thought "the availability
of capital punishment to state legislatures through statutory changes may be more theoretical than
actual." McDonald, supra note 176, at 766. Cf. Comment, Furman v. Georgia: A Postmortem on
the Death Penalty, 18 VILL. L. REv. 678, 720 (1973) (difficulty of drafting a practicable death penalty
statute). Junker summarized his sentiments as follows:
My hunch is that Furman spells the complete end of capital punishment in this country,
not because its logic requires it, but because the moral authority of the Court will command
it, and because I think I hear a collective sigh of relief emanating from legislators who
have more important business to attend to than the passage of necessarily narrow, probably
futile and possibly unconstitutional death penalty statutes.
Junker, supra note 182, at 109.
184. The idea achieves standing in the society. It is suggested again to a court. The
court this time reinterprets the prior case and in doing so adopts the rejected idea. In
I
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as a result of that experiment, the rule does not fit society's moral expectations
after all. The new rule is abandoned and the previous position is resumed, In
other settings the old rule and the anticipated new one are combined in an
uneasy compromise. In these instances the new paradigm is aborted, at least
until the compromise no longer seems justifiable. If the time comes when the
rationale is no longer acceptable, a new paradigm will replace it. In some cases
the compromise produced by the aborted paradigm itself becomes the new paradigm. The death penalty cases provide an example of this latter process, The
new paradigm was not stated in Furman, Instead, the truncation of Furman in
Gregg became the new death penalty paradigm.
E.

Rules Versus Paradigms: The Letter and the Spirit

Such notions as Hart's core and Dworkin's enactment force obscure the
lessons taught by paradigms, because they suggest that a judgment need not
be made in the application of rules. That view ignores the fact that even a
judgment simply to remain with the present rule is still
a judgment, For example, the idea of enactment force might suggest that the difference between
Furman and Gregg was that the Court merely applied the Furman standards in
Gregg. That view, however, is seriously misleading. In formal terms such as
the notion of enactment force, the standards applied in Gregg appear similar to
the standards enunciated in Furman. But the spirit in which the standards are
applied is quite different, In Furman, the Court intended to discourage the death
penalty. In Gregg, the Court had recognized the realities of its situation and
made its contingent acceptance of the death penalty.
By focusing on what rule is applied, concretist approaches such as the core
meaning of rules divert attention from the significant nuances in hto the rule
is applied.185 To conclude the same rule was applied in the two cases is a
misunderstanding, because the spirit behind those rules is different. Betweerl
Furman and Gregg, the Court had taken a different perspective on the death
penalty. Indeed, that perspective has evolved into a new paradigm, much of
the detail of which has been worked out." 6 Focusing on enactment force blots
out those significant developments for the rule's heart and soul that are revealed
only in the manner or style in which the rationale is expounded.
One contrast between the evolution of the right to counsel paradigms and
the death penalty paradigms is the degree of moral consensus regarding the

subsequent cases, the idea is given further definition and is tied to other ideas which have

been accepted by courts. It is now no longer the idea which was commonly held in the
society. It becomes modified in subsequent cases. Ideas first rejected but which gradually
have won acceptance now push what has become a legal category out of the system or
convert it into something which may be its opposite.
E. LEvW, supra note 73, at 5-6.
185. Capital punishment opponents held out hopes that factor, would work in favor of extending
Furman. Irvin and Rose stated that "a statute which appears to satisfy Furman may in its application.
fail to pass constitutional muster." Irvirt & Rose, supra note 183, at 188.
186. See, e.g., W. LOcacART, Y. KAMISAR & J. CHOPER, CONS'rTITIONAL. LAW 611-25 (5th
ed. 1980 & Supp. 84-90 1985).
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two issues. Anyone comparing the two situations would recognize that, prior
to Gregg, the Furman issue was highly problematical, because the death penalty
was an issue in ferment. 87 By contrast, appointed counsel for felons, just prior
to Gideon, was not an issue that was the subject of serious dispute. The Attorneys
General of twenty-three states joined in an amicus curiae brief urging the Supreme
Court to overrule Betts, while opposition to the change was supplied by Florida
and two other states in soulful isolation.'"" The issue was hardly the subject of
heated moral argument. The enactment force of Betts therefore appears comic.
The enactment force of Furman, on the other hand, is merely misleading rather
than inaccurate, if careful attention is paid to its limits.
A further factor to consider is the different social contexts in which decisions
must be viewed. One such setting is the immediate legal context, exemplified
by the arguments before the Court and within the legal community at the time
of Gideon. On the other hand, the broader popular setting of moral argument
is illustrated by the death penalty debate at the time of Furman. The historical
settings of these two cases differ markedly in the degree of moral consensus
both within the legal community and the larger political community. That
contrast demonstrates the present point. If enactment force is viewed as existing
in reality rather than as the product of the moral consensus of the community,
then legal thinkers are being fooled into accepting a comfortably simple fiction
in place of the complexity of reality. That reality depends in fact on the state
of moral argument both in the legal context and in the broader social context.
Hence, Dworkin is correct in claiming that law is a matter of moral argument, even when it appears to be a purely legal argument, because legal
argument is simply a particular form of moral argument. Recognition of that
insight fosters awareness that legal argument occurs in a context of generalized
moral argument. Without this background, the legal argument would have neither coherence nor meaning. Awareness of these levels, or layers, of moral
argument in law reveals a fluidity, a dynamic quality, that almost certainly
would be overlooked if law were viewed in terms of such concrete notions as
the core of rules or even enactment force. This awareness looks beyond the

187. Compare Comment, supra note 183, at 719-20 ("[A] mandatory death sentence is indicative
of regressive penology. Manifest in our penal system is the desire to reform a criminal; mandatory
death is the antithesis of this desire.") with Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v.
Georgia, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 39 ("[I]t does not seem to me necessarily barbaric, that someone
might believe that certain criminals ought to be put to death, the inhuman brutality of their crimes
being so great as to outrun all possiblity of forgiveness or amends.") and Eckardt, Punishment in
PUNISHMENT: FOR AND AGAINST 165, 169-70 (Harold Hart ed. 1971) ("All will agree that the
humanizing of the administration of justice is a good thing from the standpoint of the dignity of
persons and the quality of human relationships. However, it is not impossible that this process can
prove self-defeating if no boundaries are set upon it. Death by murder is, after all, a rather
'cruel and unusual punishment' from the point of view of the victim. The complaint is often heard
that the rights of wrongdoers are being allowed to take precedence over the rights of victims. Ought
not the targets of criminality, it is asked, be entitled to humane and civilized treatment as much
as, if not more than, their assailants? However we feel about this, we may agree that the humanization of punishment, for all its virtue and continuing urgency, can hardly be permitted to
erode all punishment away.").
188. See supra note 153.
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letter of the law to the spirit that animates the rule paradigm, giving it life in
the societal context. As the dynamic triumphs over the static in this evolution
of rules, morality becomes predominant in its interaction with law. Thus, viewing law as paradigms enhances perception of the dynamics of the interaction
of law and morality.
V.

CONCLUSION:

MORALITY

AND LAW

IN INTERACTION IN JUDICIAL

DECISIONMAKING

Conceptualist notions like the core of rules and enactment force are necessarily static in nature. The certainty sought by literal approaches such as
conceptualism is unavailable unless the concepts are held static. By contrast,
skeptics who deny that rules are capable of holding meaning consider themselves
"realistic" in asserting that certainty, and therefore stability of legal rules, is
impossible. For them, law cannot become static, because it is by nature in a
state of free-floating change. The middle view, however, perceives that law
should be both dynamic and grounded at. the same time. To fulfill its mission
in society, law must be both stable and flexible. Stability is necessary to carry
out the role of law in maintaining and enhancing social order. Flexibility is
essential if law is to adapt to the changing needs of society. To meet both
conditions simultaneously, law must continually remain in a state of flux, caught
in a tension between the pull to remain constant and the tug to stay abreast
of the times.
A.

Rules as Mental Constructs

These competing perspectives embrace quite different views of the function
of rules. The conceptualist views rules as absolute, self-applying, and concrete,
as in Hart's core or Dworkin's enactment force. That view produces the wooden
certainty of a literalistic approach, but it does so at the expense of being inconsistent with social reality. Because most people yearn for certainty, the idea
of rules having fixed meanings has a siren call. Indeed, people may fool themselves into believing in fixed meanings, simply because rules are extremely
convenient. But the convenience is not in thinking that rules are self-applying
without need for the exercise of judgment. That view distracts from the truth.
The true convenience of a rule is as a mental shorthand. Encountering a particular fact situation, the skeptic sees only the possibility of unconstrained policy.
To the skeptic's embarrassment, a judge may reason, "Oh yes, the applicable
rule is res ipsa loquitur." That rule serves as a convenient shorthand for all of
the decisions that have been reached in previous examinations of the problem.
The competing arguments, principles, and purposes have already been weighed,
leading to the comfortable conclusion that this sort of situation should be treated
in that particular way.
The evolution of the rule of separate but equal was examined earlier in this
article. That "rule" initially stands for the judgment that the Court in Plessy
v. Ferguson meant that separate facilities may sometimes satisfy the equal protection clause. The conceptualist, however, views the case as an act of legislative
choice; the Court announced a new rule which it then applied to subsequent
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cases as a matter of deductive logic. The skeptic recognizes only the possibility
of discrete choices; consequently, each case is nothing but an independent policy
decision. The views of both conceptualist and skeptic distort reality. In contrast,
the perspective of the new rhetorics provides a clearer picture. Although the
inductive reasoning process used in developing the rationale of the rule is not
absolute enough in its conclusions to satisfy the conceptualist, the nature of the
argument is nonetheless logical. Moreover, its persuasive power confounds the
skeptic by making possible both a degree of predictability and a measure of
stability in the evolution of the law.
A study of the cases succeeding Plessy reveals that, as the Court proceeded
to apply the standard that eventually came to be known as separate but equal,
the rule was gradually formulated in sharper terms. As that occurred, the Court
could expect the lower courts to apply it to a wider array of situations. During
the time that the rule continued to reign, the Court was spared the necessity
of reexamining whether the purpose of the rule was desirable. It served as a
convenient shorthand for the value-decisions embraced in its purpose.
The case study of Plessy provides the basis for framing a definition: A rule
is a mental construct which represents a temporal distillation of resolved arguments. How temporary that resolution will be varies widely in time, as the
examples canvassed in preceding sections demonstrate. The arguments resolved
and contained in the distillation are all of the persuasive arguments raised in
the process of the issue's adjudication. Although in form those arguments address the rationale of the rule, in substance they concern the just treatment of
the situation. That question of justice will necessarily be judged in light of the
morality of that society.
On this relationship of morality to law, conceptualist and skeptic again take
issue. The former sees law as conceptually separate from morality. The latter,
seeing no law, acknowledges either some form of morality only, or nothing at
all, depending on whether the skeptic is such only as to rules or to values as
well. In any event, neither can see law and morality in necessary interaction.
But the present definition of a rule consists of just such a necessary interaction,
a dynamic tension between the effort to formulate a settled practice and the
struggle to adapt to evolving values and circumstances. Hence, as long as the
social definition of the situation remains relatively constant, and the conception
of the just treatment of that situation also holds steady, then the mental construct
enshrined in that rule will continue to represent a convenient and useful shorthand.
B.

The Rationale of Paradigms

The definition of rules set forth above assumes the dynamic context of a
changing society. It therefore projects an evolutionary perspective on law in
which legal rules evolve over time. In that light, Thomas Kuhn's view of the
historical evolution of science may usefully be applied to law. From that perspective, rules are viewed as paradigms. But only the middle view of rules
finds utility in paradigms. For the skeptic, even that degree of order is impossible, a self-deception. For the conceptualist, the idea is irrelevant, asserting
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a necessary morality of law by claiming the rationale as part of the rule. As
89
seen earlier, Hart categorically rejects that idea.' But the middle view proudly
claims the rationale as the heart and soul of the rule, accepting bravely the
90
moral challenge that implies.
The middle view also finds compatible the idea that routine legal "science"
is undertaken within established rule paradigms. Because of the pressures of
the moral challenge, however, those paradigms break down from time to time
and must be replaced by new paradigms. For example, the Plessy paradigm
was replaced by the paradigm of Brown v. Board of Education. That paradigm
has, in turn, been partially superceded by a paradigm of racial integration,
albeit one whose contours are neither entirely consistent nor completely settled. 19'
Each of these paradigms has served as the reigning rule for its respective period
of ascendancy.
Moreover, legal change occurs at two levels: within a rule paradigm and
from one paradigm to the next. Obviously, interparadigm change is major
change. Paradigm shift is the sort of change illustrated by the breakdown in
persuasiveness of the "separate but equal" rule of PLessy and its replacement
in Brown with a new paradigm of equal protection. New paradigms arise in
response to dissatisfaction with the existing paradigm. Several factors are potentially responsible for such change: 1) the inconsistency of the old paradigm's
rationale with the rationales of other rule paradigms; 2) the perceived unfairness
of the existing rationale of the paradigm; and/or 3) the failure of the social
definition of the situation assumed by the rule to meet presently accepted standards of morality.
When Brown supplanted the rule of Plessy, each of these factors was involved:
Inconsistency with the rationale of other rule/paradigms, perceived unfairness
of the rationale of separate but equal, and perceived failure of the social situation
of blacks as defined by the rule to match the existing standards of morality.
The perceived unfairness of the rationale of Plessy is shown by the failure of
the Court to apply it purposefully for such a long period prior to Brown. Likewise, the language of those cases shows the Court had become increasingly
uncomfortable with the implicit expression of moral approval for a caste system
in American society. Finally, in its treatment of racial equality in the restrictive
covenant cases' 92 and in the voting rights cases,193 the Court had been applying
rules whose rationale was made consistent with the rationale of separate but
equal only with great strain and discomfort.

189.
190.
191.
443 U.S.
of Univ.

See H. HART, supra note 42, at 614.
See L. FULLER, supra note 69, at 89.
Compare Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), and United Steel Workers v. Weber,
193 (1979), with Firefighters Local 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984), and Regents
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

192. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
193. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
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The Challenge of Consistency

Each factor of dissatisfaction creates tension, because the Court questions
whether it is acting consistently. The apparent inconsistency challenges the Court
to take a coherent moral stand. The decline of Plessy demonstrates the significance of the demand for consistency. To justify a decision, as Dworkin says,
a theory must be derived which provides a consistent explanation of all rules
and principles in the system. ' 94 If that cannot be done, if no consistent justification for the rules can be found, then the resulting tension presses for resolution. It engenders a form of cognitive dissonance' 95 in which a court, having
the task of providing justifications for its decisions, must provide one kind of
justification in a certain set of cases and a different, not really consistent,
justification in other similar but separately treated cases.' 9 6 The Court is pressed
to achieve consistency by ironing out the conflicts between the rationales of
these competing lines of cases. The conflict can, of course, be resolved by
framing a new rule paradigm whose rationale is compatible with related paradigms.
Although the preceding discussion purports to concern major change between
paradigms, much of it applies with equal force to change within paradigms.
Carrying on what Kuhn calls normal science, practitioners operate within a
paradigm, working out the detailed contours of the reigning rule. Routine science produces a developing conception of the paradigm's meaning. Similarly,
routine d- cisions in law constitute a growing awareness of the meaning of the
rule. Those decisions appear to be made primarily with reference to the rationale
of the reigning rule paradigm, but comparable principles or rationales of similar
paradigms are also implicated in the decision. Finally, lurking in the background
are general conceptions of morality beyond the particular bundle of moral concepts essential in the statement of the individual paradigm. The growth and
development of any rule can be traced in its history. Such an examination
reveals how the rule has expanded, eroded, or undergone less perceptible change
in response to all of the factors mentioned above.
D.

Moral Argument and Legal Change

In sum, the process of change within a paradigm is different in scope from
interparadigm change. But the two sorts of change are not really different in
kind. Each focuses on the moral acceptability of the rationale of the rule. Both
sorts of change respond to the evolving morality of society as that morality is
reflected both directly in standards of fairness, as well as indirectly in the moral
connotations that are attributed to situations in the process of their social definition. Although this method of viewing rules is quite in harmony with the
middle view of law, it is inconsistent with conceptualism and skepticism. The

194. See R. DWORKIN, supra note 92, at 116-17.
195. See generally L. FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957).
196. The court is caught in the same kind of conflict that Fuller predicted for Holmes' "bad
man," if he were to try to appear moral while acting amorally. L. FULLER, THE LAw IN QUEST
OF ITSELF

92-95 (1940).
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reasons have already been stated. Conceptualism manages its rigid certainty in.
part by excluding the morality that would creep in were the rationale admitted
to be part of the rule. Skepticism harvests anarchy by denying the common
sense of the middle view that a common purpose can be pursued with a reasonable degree of coherence.
The most important lesson to be learned from the paradigm metaphor,
however, is that the impact of morality is both greater and less than it is often
seen to be. Virtually everyone concedes that morality is intimately involved in
the major turning points that occur as paradigm shifts. Gonceptualists accept
that view by labeling the occurrence judicial legislation. But the paradigm mode
teaches that change is not usually abrupt enough to be honestly categorized
that way, even when it may seem so in retrospect. Moral argument is central
to the legal change, but there is more concession to the pull of the past rationale
and less to the emerging one than is often believed.
On the other hand, routine legal work is regularly dismissed as not involving
moral argument, at least in any central way. Acknowledgment of some role for
morality -can be avoided only by defining a rule in such a way as to exclude
its rationale. The conceptualist resorts to such a definition. But the focus on
rationale that characterizes work within paradigms belies that avoidance of the
moral interface. When a legal rule is scrutinized in light of its purpose, its
continuing evolution is seen within a framework that is infused with morality.
That recognition of the significance of morality to routine legal work may be
the most important insight that a paradigm view of judicial decisionmaking can
offer.
It is appropriate to add a word of appreciation for the contribution of Judge
Ginsburg to this issue. Her article provides both detail and statistics that enhance appreciation of the fact that the prime focus of an intermediate appellate
court is on the tremendous volume of routine legal work to be carried on within
paradigms provided by previous decisions and statutes. 197 Her exposition also
demonstrates that very little of that work is easy enough to be fobbed off as
merely mechanical. The tough part is the reasoning that is the judge's obligation. In making that reasoning her central focus, Judge Ginsburg provides
a salutary emphasis on the role of persuasive argument in judicial decision.
She also offers an important reminder of the collegial nature of the judging
enterprise. This special environment heightens the role of persuasion in the
process. Lawyers first offer persuasive argument to judges, and the judges then
convince one another of the more satisfactory view. Viewing judging as a collective endeavor (of panels, of the entire circuit, of all circuits, of all judges)
emphasizes its social nature. Understood in all its ramifications, the social nature
of the judging process has its fundamental import in enhancing awareness of
the interaction of morality and law in the decisions that judges must make.
197.

Ginsburg, supra note 96, at 205.
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